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The ability of firms to reposition their products can determine the effects of demand shocks, mergers
and policy interventions in differentiated product markets. This paper estimates a dynamic oligopoly
model to measure repositioning costs in the commercial radio industry. Based on a set of markets where
industry revenues were around $88 billion, I find that stations may have spent as much as $6 billion
on repositioning. However, repositioning costs are not large enough to prevent radio markets adapting








atsweet@duke.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
While there have been considerable advances in modelling consumer demand in diﬀerentiated product
markets in the last 15 years (for example, Berry et al. (1995) and Hendel and Nevo (2006)), almost
all analyses treat the set of available products as given. Yet in many industries the set of available
products changes quite frequently and the ability of ﬁrms to alter their product oﬀerings could sub-
stantially aﬀect the outcomes of demand shocks or policy changes. For example, the medium-run
eﬀects of rising gas prices and environmental policies on the automobile industry will depend on how
diﬃcult and costly it is for American manufacturers to introduce more fuel eﬃcient models (Berry et
al. (1993)).
The potential for product repositioning already plays an important role in the analysis of horizontal
mergers. In particular, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize that if repositioning costs are
small then the threat of repositioning by competitors may constrain market power even if demand-side
substitution is limited (US Department of Justice (1997)). However, even though the potential for
repositioning has been an issue in the analysis of mergers in industries as diverse as fountain pens,
chewing tobacco, commercial radio and organic supermarkets, these analyses have taken place without
any detailed study of how costly it is for ﬁrms to reposition their products in these types of industries.1
This paper ﬁlls this gap in the literature by estimating a dynamic oligopoly model to measure
the costs associated with format switching in the broadcast radio industry. The basic structure of
the model is as follows. In each period, a random coeﬃcients demand model determines station
audiences as a function of station formats, observed and unobserved station characteristics and local
tastes, which depend on evolving market demographics. A revenue function translates audiences into
revenues, allowing for listeners with diﬀerent demographics to have diﬀerent values to advertisers.
Stations choose their formats to maximize expected future proﬁts, recognizing how their choices may
1See the Department of Justice’s Competitive Impact Statement in “United States vs. Clear Channel
Communications, Inc. and AMFM, Inc.” (http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f6900/6985.pdf), the District Court
decisions “United States vs. Gillette Co.” (828 F.Supp. 78) and “FTC v. Swedish Match et al.”
(131 F. Supp 2d 151) and the FTC complaint in “FTC vs. Whole Foods Inc. and Wild Oats Inc.”
(http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710114/070605complaint.pdf). Froeb et al. (2007) provide a theoretical analysis
of repositioning after mergers, focusing on repositioning by the merging ﬁrms.
2aﬀect the future format choices of other stations.
The model allows for repositioning to be costly in three diﬀerent ways. First, switching may
reduce a station’s quality, lowering its audience (quality eﬀect). Second, it may cause revenues to
fall, conditional on listenership, as the station searches for new advertisers (revenue eﬀect). Third,
there may be additional sunk expenditures associated with repositioning (sunk repositioning costs).
These costs could arise from replacing staﬀ, updating the station’s programming library, hiring format
consultants or additional marketing.
I estimate the model using a two-step approach. In the ﬁrst step I estimate the demand model, the
revenue function, station strategies and the transition processes for market demographics and station
qualities. Assumptions on the timing of format choices allow me to estimate demand consistently
even though format choices are endogenous. The ﬁrst step provides estimates of the quality and
revenue eﬀects. In the second step I bound sunk repositioning costs using a moment inequality
estimator.
I ﬁnd that both the revenue eﬀect and sunk repositioning costs are signiﬁcant, but that there is
no evidence of a signiﬁcant quality eﬀect as switching stations gain listeners even in the short-run.
These qualitative results are broadly consistent with the Department of Justice’s view of why format
switching is costly.2 My analysis also provides quantitative estimates. The revenue eﬀect reduces
station revenues by about 12% in the quarters immediately following a switch. The lower bound
estimates of the additional sunk costs are of a roughly similar size. The upper bound estimates are
larger, equal to about one year’s revenue for the average switching station. The upper bound estimates
imply that the sample stations spent over $6 billion on sunk repositioning costs compared with total
revenues of $88 billion (at 2004 prices) between 1997 and 2006. The dollar value of repositioning costs
increases with market revenues, suggesting that markets of diﬀerent sizes may adjust just as quickly
2“And, as we have learned through our investigations, the cost of these promotional expenditures and the loss of
advertising revenue during the course of the format change while the station looks for new advertisers can be high.
Picking up on this last point, the theory that says radio stations will jump in with new formats to defeat price increases
makes the questionable assumption that it’s as easy to change formats as it is changing clothes. But that grossly
overstates the situation. As a practical matter, almost any existing station has invested time, money and eﬀort to
develop its format, audience and advertising base. If it decides to change its format, it must abandon at least some of
these on-going relationships.” (Klein (1997))
3to demand shocks or mergers.
I also estimate some of the eﬀects of the repositioning that I observe in the sample. Repositioning
raised Hispanic listening by over 20%, as stations entered Spanish-language formats in many markets.
Black listening also increased as stations switched to Urban and Contemporary Hit Radio formats.
When I simulate the model I also ﬁnd that stations move quite quickly in response to changes in
ethnic/racial demographics, an example of a relatively permanent demand shock. Repositioning
reduced the listenership of older listeners as there was some exit from formats such as Variety, Big
Band and Easy Listening.
I also estimate how format switching aﬀected the revenues of switching and non-switching stations.
While repositioning tended to increase the revenues of switching stations, the average eﬀect on non-
switchers was small as in most cases repositioning simply changed which stations faced the most
competition.
The paper is unusual in focusing on product repositioning by incumbents rather than market
e n t r yb yn e wﬁrms. This focus makes sense in my industry where spectrum constraints and licensing
restrictions make station entry and exit unusually rare. However, repositioning is also likely to be
the more important margin of change in any industry with large scale and scope economies (such
as automobiles) especially in the relatively short time horizons considered in many policy analyses.3
For example, merger analysis asks whether entry or repositioning could constrain market power in a
period of one to two years.
There are several features of the radio industry which make it an excellent place to study repo-
sitioning. The existence of discrete measures of positioning (formats) and the lack of technological
barriers to repositioning provide a close ﬁt to the model which I set out below. The local nature
of the industry allows me to observe many examples of format switching even though the rate of
switching is quite low. In addition, some of the most important drivers of repositioning, such as
demographic changes, are observable and diﬀer signiﬁcantly across markets. Finally, the feasibility
3Bernard et al. (2006) show that changes in the products oﬀered by existing ﬁrms account for much larger changes
in output than ﬁrm entry and exit in most manufacturing industries.
4of repositioning has been a substantive issue in the analysis of many radio stations mergers. My
estimates of repositioning costs are therefore directly relevant to an on-going policy debate.
1.1 Relationship to the Existing Literature
1.1.1 Format Switching and Repositioning Costs
The substantive topic of the paper is related to a couple of other literatures. Berry and Waldfogel
(2001) and Sweeting (2006) provide reduced-form analyses of how radio station ownership aﬀects
variety and listenership. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) ﬁnd evidence of excess entry in the radio
industry, in the sense of Mankiw and Whinston (1986), using a static entry model. Tyler Mooney
(2006) uses a static structural model to show that during the late 1990s stations migrated to formats
which were more valued by advertisers. Romeo and Dick (2005) show that stations gain listeners
when they switch format.
While there has been no previous attempt to estimate the costs which ﬁrms have to pay to
reposition their products in a horizontally diﬀerentiated industry, there have been several attempts to
estimate the migration costs paid by individuals or households when moving between diﬀerent cities
(Kennan and Walker (2006), Bayer and Juessen (2006) and Gemici (2007)) oﬀering diﬀerent labor
market opportunities. The ﬁrm setting is more complex in that it is necessary to model competitive
interactions between ﬁrms. On the other hand, it may be easier to estimate the opportunities facing
ﬁrms in diﬀerent market niches than it is to estimate the labor market opportunities available to a
particular household.
1.1.2 Estimation of Dynamic Oligopoly Models
A dynamic model is needed to estimate repositioning costs because the returns from repositioning are
likely to be realized over a number of periods during which a market might evolve in many diﬀerent
ways. Several recent papers (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari et al. (2007), Berry et al.
(2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003)) have proposed methodologies for estimating
5dynamic discrete choice games with Markov Perfect Nash Equilibria. Following Hotz and Miller
(1993) and Hotz et al. (1994) in the single agent setting, these approaches avoid solving for equilibrium
strategies at each step of the estimation process. The approach which I take is closest to the two-step
procedure suggested by Bajari et al. (2007). In the second step, I use moment inequalities to estimate
repositioning costs, using the methods proposed by Pakes et al. (2006). These methods have been
used by Ho (2007) and Ishii (2005) to estimate models in static settings. Holmes (2007) uses these
methods in a dynamic analysis of Wal-Mart’s store location problem.
Ryan (2005), Collard-Wexler (2005), Beresteanu and Ellickson (2006) and Macieira (2006) have es-
timated dynamic oligopoly models using industry data. Ryan (2005) and Collard-Wexler (2005) exam-
ine entry and exit in the homogenous product cement and ready-mix concrete industries. Beresteanu
and Ellickson (2006) and Macieira (2006) use logit demand models to allow for a simple form of ver-
tical product diﬀerentiation in the supermarket and supercomputer industries. In the radio industry
both horizontal product diﬀerentiation and vertical product diﬀerentiation are important and I use a
rich random coeﬃcients demand model to capture these eﬀects.
The two-step estimation approach requires me to consistently estimate a model of listener demand
in the ﬁrst step allowing for format choices to be endogenous.4 I achieve this by making assumptions
on the timing of innovations in station quality relative to station format choices. This is similar to the
way in which the structural productivity literature uses timing assumptions to address the endogeneity
of input choices (Olley and Pakes (1996), Blundell and Bond (2000), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
Ackerberg et al. (2005)).5
4The endogeneity problem could also be solved by estimating demand and product choice simultaneously, as attempted
in the static setting by Crawford and Shum (2006) and Draganska et al. (2006). This type of approach would not be
computationally feasible in a dynamic setting with a rich model of demand.
5Berry et al. (1995), p. 854, recognize that timing assumptions might be used in the demand context. Einav’s (2007)
approach to dealing with the endogeneity of movie release dates by assuming a particular process for the decay of a
movie’s appeal has a similar spirit.
61.2 Outline
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 presents some stylized
facts on format switching. Section 4 presents the model and Section 5 details the estimation procedure.
The empirical results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2D a t a
Data on station characteristics (formats, band, signal coverage etc.), station ownership and station
ratings are taken from BIAfn’s Media Access Pro database.6 This database also includes BIAfn’s
estimates of station advertising revenues. I use data from the Spring and Fall quarters each year from
Spring 1996 to Spring 2006, although 56 markets are missing share data for Fall 1996.7 The database
only contains ratings data for commercial stations, and only these stations are used in what follows.8
2.1 Formats
Table 1 lists the ten formats used to categorize each station’s programming together with several
measures of listener demographics.9 These formats combine some of BIAfn’s format categories, such
as Rock and Album Oriented Rock, which are particularly similar. The “Other Music” format
includes several format categories which appeal to older listeners. The structural model also includes
a “Dark” format for stations which are oﬀ-air.
2.2 Geographic Markets and Demographic Data
Arbitron deﬁnes local radio markets for estimating station ratings. These markets are also used
by the FCC and the Department of Justice. The stylized facts below are based on data from 274
6Some gaps in the BIAfn data, including data on stations leaving the industry before 2001 were ﬁlled in using old
editions of Duncan’s American Radio.
7Smaller markets are only rated in the Spring and Fall quarters, so using data from only these quarters avoids having
to deal with problems where markets are observed with diﬀerent frequencies.
8I include market-format ﬁxed eﬀects in the demand speciﬁcation which should control for the eﬀect of non-commercial
stations which remain in the same format and do not change quality over time.
9The format trends data reported on Arbitron’s website indicates that there has been relatively little change in format
demographics from 1998 to 2006.
7Arbitron markets, excluding Puerto Rico, markets dropped by Arbitron prior to 2006 and markets
added by Arbitron after 2001. Local market demographics (age, sex and ethnicity/race combinations)
are measured using the US Census’s Annual County Population Estimates aggregated to the market
level.10
Some Arbitron radio markets are close enough that stations from several markets may compete
for the same listeners. I include these markets when presenting several stylized facts about format
switching but I exclude them when estimating the structural model to avoid modelling interactions
between markets.
2.3 Station Listenership and Revenue Data
Arbitron reports quarterly estimates of station listenership based on diaries completed by a sample
of listeners. I use the station’s aggregate market share, where the market is the time available to
the population aged 12 and above during a broadcast week of Monday-Sunday 6am-midnight.11 As
described in Section 5, I also use Arbitron data on the average demographics of listeners to each
format in Arbitron’s 100 largest markets. I use BIAfn’s estimates of annual station revenues. These
estimates are based on a combination of data reported by stations and a proprietary formula.
3 Format Switching: Some Stylized Facts
This section brieﬂy describes several stylized facts about format switching and what happens to
stations’ listenership when they switch formats. I focus on those facts which are informative about
repositioning costs and which motivate the structure of my model. The statistics are based on stations
in their home markets.
10The estimates come from July of each year, so I interpolate to give numbers for the Spring and Fall quarters.
Counties are matched to markets using Arbitron’s 2005 market deﬁnitions. Market deﬁnitions are changed only rarely.
11This share is calculated by multiplying the station’s “AQH Share” (which measures its share of all radio-listening),
reported by BIAfn, with the market’s APR ﬁgure(which measures the proportion of people aged 12 and above listening
to radio). The APR numbers come from Duncan’s American Radio up to 2001, M Street’s STAR database for 2002
and Spring 2003 and from additional data provided by BIAfn from Fall 2004. For the two missing numbers I simply
interpolate between the missing quarters. This is reasonable as APR numbers change relatively little from quarter to
quarter.
81. The switching rate is 4.2% per half-year and AM and FM Stations exhibit distinctive
switching patterns. Table 2 shows the format-to-format switching matrices for AM and FM sta-
tions. On average, 4.2% of stations switch formats every half-year (the data comes from the Spring
and Fall quarters) with 3,830 switches observed in the data. Switching patterns diﬀer across bands.
AM stations are more likely to switch to talk formats, such as News/Talk and Religious, consistent
with the AM signal providing lower quality for music programming. This diﬀerence is potentially
useful in revealing how sensitive switching behavior is to diﬀerences in expected revenues. FM sta-
tions switch more evenly across formats. In particular, FM stations are not systematically more
likely to switch between diﬀerent contemporary music formats (e.g., Country and Rock) than between
these formats and non-music programming. This suggests that my format classiﬁcation does identify
diﬀerent types of programming and that, as I assume below, the costs of switching between diﬀerent
pairs of formats are similar.12
2. Format switchers stations gain signiﬁcant listenership. Figure 1 shows what happens, on
average, to a station’s share when it switches formats. Market shares are measured as the percentage
of time spent listening to a station by people aged 12 and above during a broadcast week of Monday-
Sunday 6 am-12 pm (the sum of market shares for all of the stations in market is typically around 13%).
In the ﬁgure I normalize the station’s share to be zero in the period (-1) immediately prior to the
switch (the average switcher has a market share of 0.5%).13 A station’s share increases signiﬁcantly
in the two periods (one year) following a format switch and then levels oﬀ.
I focus on horizontal product repositioning as the way in which stations gain listeners/revenues,
modelling the evolution of station quality in a simple way. Figure 2 provides some evidence that format
switching is a major way in which stations gain listeners. The solid line shows the kernel density of
12The average changes in market share for stations making diﬀerent kinds of switch are also not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one another. Of course, these patterns partly reﬂect the fact that my coarse format deﬁnitions exclude very small
changes in programming (e.g., Soft Adult Contemporary to Lite Adult Contemporary) which are more common.
13The plotted points are coeﬃcients from a station-ﬁxed eﬀects regressions including a full set of Arbitron quarter
dummies and dummies for the quarters around a switch. Only stations observed for all of the quarters around the
switch are included. Stations switching to and from the inactive format (Dark) are excluded.
9changes in share over a two year period and the dashed line shows the proportion of stations in each
share change bin which switched formats during the same two year period. The average proportion
of stations changing format is 0.15, but this rises to over 0.5 for stations experiencing the largest
share increases. The diagram also shows that relatively few format switchers lose signiﬁcant share
suggesting that they may face relatively little uncertainty about how they will perform in their new
formats.
3. The rate of format switching is similar in markets of diﬀerent sizes. If the dollar value
of format switching costs is the same in every market then one would expect to observe less switching
in smaller markets where stations have fewer listeners and lower revenues. One would also expect to
see switching stations increasing their market shares by larger amounts in smaller markets. Figures
3(a) and (b) show that the rate of switching and the share gain of switchers is very similar across
markets of diﬀerent sizes, suggesting that repositioning costs must be smaller in smaller markets.
One can calculate a very rough estimate of the magnitude of repositioning costs using an estimate
of the value of listeners gained following a format switch. For example, suppose that the marginal
switcher expects its market share to permanently increase by 0.08 percentage points if it switches and
that both the market population and the price per listener are ﬁxed at their average 2004 values.
Assuming an annual discount rate of 10%, Table 3 lists the present discounted value of this change
in share in ﬁve markets. Of course, there are many things that this calculation ignores, such as the
diﬀerence in the expectations of the marginal and the average switching station, the diﬀerent value to
advertisers of diﬀerent groups of listeners and the many ways in which markets might evolve in the
future. The structural model is designed to take these factors into account.
4. Changes in market demographics and competition aﬀe c tf o r m a ts w i t c h i n g . My model
explains format switching by competition for listeners and changes in market demographics, espe-
cially changes in their ethnic/racial composition. Table 4 shows coeﬃcients from long-diﬀerenced
IV regressions (Spring 1996 to Spring 2006 for those markets always followed by Arbitron) where the
10dependent variable is the proportion of local stations in a format and the explanatory variables include
ethnic/racial demographics and the market share achieved by out of market stations as a measure of
competition. This variable is potentially endogenous and I instrument for it as explained in the notes
beneath the table.
The coeﬃcients show the expected pattern. Increasing black (Hispanic) populations are associated
with more Urban and Religious (Spanish) stations. Competition generally reduces the number of
stations in a format and the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant when the formats are pooled together.
4 A Dynamic Model of the Radio Industry
This section describes the various components of the dynamic model of the radio industry.
4.1 State Space
The state space is composed of (i) a set of station, market and format characteristics which are
observed by all stations when they make their format switching decisions and which are observed
or can be estimated by the econometrician (denoted S in what follows), and (ii) a set of iid private
information payoﬀ “shocks” that aﬀect a station’s payoﬀ from making each format choice for the next
period.
4.1.1 Station Characteristics
There are Nm stations in market m. Each station is in exactly one format in each quarter. There
are eleven available formats (F) :t h o s el i s t e di nT a b l e1a n da“ D a r k ”f o r m a t( 0) for inactive stations.
Each station has several observed quality characteristics which are assumed to be ﬁxed over time:
band, signal coverage, transmitter power, year ﬁrst on air and out of market status. The quality of
AM stations is also allowed to vary by format. Each station also has a quality component ξsmt which
can evolve over time. This is not directly observed in the data but I assume that it can be estimated.
Treating the number of stations as ﬁxed is a simpliﬁcation, but it is a reasonable ﬁrst approximation
11in this industry. Entry is severely limited by both spectrum constraints, especially in larger markets
and in densely-populated regions of the country, and by the FCC’s licensing process. As a result
there are only 290 examples of new entry during the sample period, compared with 4,739 stations
active in 1996. There were also less than 50 examples of exit and many of these were due to the FCC
withdrawing the station’s license.14 I assume that entrants and exiters are in the Dark format when
they are not active.
4.1.2 Market Characteristics
T h ep o p u l a t i o ni ne a c hm a r k e ti sm a d eu po f1 8m u t u a lly exclusive age-gender-ethnic/race groups (3
age x 2 gender x 3 ethnic/racial). Age-gender mixes diﬀer relatively little within markets over time
and I only model the growth of the three ethnic/racial groups (non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic
blacks and Hispanics), assuming that the same growth rate applies to each of the relevant age-gender
groups. Each market is also associated with a particular advertising price per listener and each format
in each market has a particular attractiveness to listeners (γF
m) which is assumed to be ﬁxed over time
a n dw h i c hc a nb ee s t i m a t e d .
4.2 Timing
There are an inﬁnite sequence of periods, corresponding to the Spring and Fall ratings quarters. In
each period the timing of the game is as follows:
1. stations observe current station qualities, formats, market demographics and the attractiveness
of each format;
2. listeners choose which station to listen to basedo nc u r r e n ts t a t i o nq u a l i t i e s ,f o r m a t sa n dt h e
attractiveness of each format. Station listenership is translated into revenues by a function
14These counts of entry and exit exclude cases of a construction licence being granted but the being relinquished
without the station ever going on-air. The entry count also does not include stations which start being rated by
Arbitron during the sample period because they gain enough listeners to start meeting Arbitron’s Minimum Reporting
Standard (about 0.3% of radio listening). The analysis in Berry and Waldfogel (2001) would include these examples as
cases of station entry.
12capturing the operation of the advertising market. Active stations incur a ﬁxed cost;
3. each station observes additive random shocks (εF)t oi t sp a y o ﬀs from choosing to be in a partic-
ular format in the next quarter. These shocks are iid across stations, formats and time and are
private information to the station. Having observed its εFs, each station simultaneously chooses
a format for the next period. Station payoﬀs (advertising revenues, ﬁxed costs, repositioning
costs, εF) for the current period are realized; and,
4. station formats change according to station format choices. Other features of the state space,
including the unobserved station qualities, evolve according to the stochastic processes described
below.
4.3 Static Station Payoﬀs
As t a t i o n ’ sp a y o ﬀ in a period depends on its listenership, which is translated into dollars by a revenue
function, a ﬁxed cost and its format switching choice. Formally, the payoﬀ for station s in market m
and format fst in quarter t which chooses fst+1 for the next quarter is
πsmt(f,S,ε st,α,θ,σ)=R(Lsmt(S,Γ),α) − θ1I(fst+1 6= fst,f st+1 6=0 )
− θ2I(fst 6=0 )+σεF
st(fst+1)
L and R are the functions determining listenerhip and revenues. The parameter θ1 is the sunk
repositioning cost paid when a station switches to a diﬀerent active format and θ2 is a per-period
ﬁx e dc o s tp a i dw h e nas t a t i o n is on-air (not Dark). σ scales the iid payoﬀ shocks (εF
st)w h i c ha r e
assumed to be drawn from a Type I extreme value (Gumbel) distribution with location parameter 0.
Diﬀerences in the εFs can be interpreted as reﬂecting heterogeneity in format repositioning costs and
I use this interpretation in Section 6.
134.3.1 Listener Demand (Lsmt(S,Γ))
Listener demand is determined through a static, discrete choice, random coeﬃcients logit model. The
market is deﬁned as the time available to people aged 12 and above. Each listener chooses at most
one station. The utility listener i in market m receives by choosing station s in quarter t is
uismt = γC
i + FsmtγF
imt + XsfstγS + ξsmt + νL
ist (1)
where Fsmt is a row vector indicating the current format of station s and νL
ist is the standard logit
error. γC














m is a vector of market-format ﬁxed eﬀects which allows tastes to vary across markets and controls




S allow additively separable eﬀects of age, ethnicity/race and gender on format preferences. The
vF
i s are assumed to be drawn from a standard normal distribution and allow for individuals to have
systematic preferences for stations in the same format in addition to those due to demographics. As
is standard in most of the literature, ΓF
RC is assumed to be diagonal. Xsfs are observed characteristics
of station s, such as signal coverage, as well as a full set of AM band-format interactions. ξsmt is the
unobserved component of station quality. It is assumed that all listeners value ξsmt and the observed
Xsfs characteristics in the same way.
4.3.2 Revenue Function, R(L,α)
The revenue function is used to translate listenership into dollars of revenue. In the simplest speciﬁ-
cation, I assume that station s in market m in quarter t receives revenues Rsmdt when it is chosen by
14a listener with demographics d
Rsmdt = αmy(t)(1 + WsmtαW)(1 + DdαD)+εR
smt (3)
αmy(t) are a full set of market-year ﬁxed eﬀects which capture diﬀerences in advertiser demand that
are common across all stations in a market. I use market-year ﬁxed eﬀects as revenues are reported on
an annual, rather than quarterly, basis. W captures additional station characteristics. In particular,
I allow per listener revenues to vary with the degree of competition that the station faces in its format
and whether the station is commonly owned. I also allow an additional eﬀect of a recent format switch
on revenues, as format-switchers may have to lower advertising prices or carry fewer commercials while
they develop new relationships with advertisers.
4.4 Evolution of the State Space
Three parts of the state space evolve over time: station formats, unobserved station qualities and
market ethnic/racial demographics. Station formats evolve deterministically with station choices.
4.4.1 Unobserved Station Quality








for stations remaining in the same format where ν1smt are iid innovations in quality drawn from some
distribution. The μ
ξ










15for stations switching formats. This second transition process applies only between the periods when
the format switch takes place.
4.4.2 Market Demographics
I assume that the growth rate of each ethnic/racial group e also follows a stationary AR(1) process
gD
emt = ρDgD
emt−1 + μD + νD
emt (6)
where νD
emt ∼ N(0,ηe). I assume that the parameters are the same for all ethnic/racial groups, but
with a high value of ρD, the current rapid growth of Hispanic populations in many markets tends to
persist for some years into the future.
4.4.3 Repositioning Costs
The model allows for three diﬀerent types of repositioning cost. First, a station’s quality may
fall when it switches formats causing it to lose listeners (μ
ξ
2). Second, a station may receive lower
revenues, for given listenership, following a format switch as it searches for new advertisers (WsmtαW).
Third, a station may have to pay additional sunk costs when switching (θ1). These costs could
result from hiring format consultants, marketing the station, replacing staﬀ or making investments in
programming that have not been explicitly modelled.
4.5 Equilibrium Concept: Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
In common with the literature, I assume that stations play a symmetric, anonymous, stationary, pure
strategy Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium.15 Formally, a station’s Markov Perfect strategy ςs is a
function mapping from the current observable state space (S) and the station’s own current payoﬀ
15This involves making an assumption that this type of equilibrium exists as well as which equilibrium is played if
there are several. Dorazelski and Satterthwaite (2003) examine the existence of Markov Perfect Nash equilibria in
dynamic oligopoly models. One obvious diﬀerence between my model and the stylized model that they consider is that
I have continuous rather than discrete state variables, but one could convert my state variables into discrete ones by
considering an arbitrarily ﬁne discretization.
16shocks (the εF
s s) to actions (format choices), i.e., ςs : S x εF
s → As.










where β is the common discount factor, πs(S,ςs(S,ε F
s )) are its static payoﬀsa saf u n c t i o no ft h e
state variables and its own strategy and P(S0|ς(S,ε F),S) is the probability that the state in the next
quarter will be S0 given current state S and the strategy proﬁles of all stations ς.F o r ς∗
s to be optimal








Prior to the realization of the εF
s s a station’s optimal strategy implies a probability distribution over
format choices. A proﬁle of strategies ς∗ is a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium if each station’s
strategy is optimal given the strategies of other stations.
An important simplifying assumption is that stations are treated as entities maximizing their
individual payoﬀs, even though many stations are commonly owned and there was increasing common
ownership during the sample period. Common ownership could aﬀect format choices because owners
want to avoid audience cannibalization, desire to exercise market power over listeners or advertisers
or exploit economies of scope by oﬀering similar kinds of programming on diﬀerent stations. It is
beyond the scope of the current paper to include the eﬀects of common ownership in the dynamic
model. Instead I attempt to control for the eﬀects of common ownership on station revenues and




I follow most of the recent literature by estimating the model using a two-step approach. Listener
demand, station strategies, the revenue function and transition processes of the state variables are
e s t i m a t e di nt h eﬁrst step. In the second step the remaining parameters of the payoﬀ function (θ1,θ2
and σ) are estimated. This involves using forward simulation to calculate future station payoﬀsa n d
then ﬁnding the parameters which make the observed policies optimal. I follow standard practice in
assuming, rather than estimating, the value of the discount factor (β =0 .95).
5.2 First Step: Listener Demand and Station Quality Transitions
I estimate the parameters of the demand model and the transition processes governing unobserved
station quality using a GMM procedure. My assumptions on the timing of format choices and
innovations in quality allow for consistent estimation of these parameters even though format choices
are endogenous.
5.2.1 Quasi-Diﬀerenced Demand Moments
The “mean utility” of station s in market m at time t is
δsmt = FsmtγF
m + XsfsγS + ξsmt = ] XsmtΓL + ξsmt (9)
where ΓL are the linear demand parameters. An endogeneity problem arises if unobservable qualities
ξsmt are correlated with local format tastes. A correlation would exist if, for example, higher quality
stations tend to select into formats which are more popular (e.g., Country might be a more attractive
format for a high quality station in Knoxville, TN than Boston, MA).16
16In my setting it is important to distinguish between the role of format and station quality in explaining station
listenership. For example, if there is high listening to Country in Knoxville only because Country is popular in
Knoxville then other stations may want to switch into Country. On the other hand, if Country listening is high because
the stations in Country are of high quality then other stations would have less incentive to enter the format.
18My assumptions on the timing of innovations in station quality allow me to overcome the endo-
geneity problem. Speciﬁcally I assume that the innovation in unobserved quality between period t
and t +1is only realized after the format choice for period t +1is made. This allows me to form
moments based on the innovations in quality.








so that the innovation in quality can be found by taking quasi-diﬀerences
















A similar quasi-diﬀerence gives the innovation in quality for format switchers




















The innovations can be used to form moment conditions
E[Zsmtνsmt(Γ,ρ ξ)] = 0 (15)
where the Zs are instruments. Under my assumptions, all of the observed station characteristics,
including formats at t and t − 1, are valid instruments. The inclusion of both ] Xsmt and ^ Xsmt−1 as
instruments results in a large degree of overidentiﬁcation as the ΓL parameters on them are restricted
to be the same. Additional instruments, based on format x demographic and competition interactions,
19help to identify the non-linear taste parameters.17 I also include the log of the t − 1 market share
interacted with an indicator for whether the station changes formats to help identify the ρξs.
Mechanically the calculation of these moments works as follows. First, the contraction mapping
procedure of Berry et al (1995) is used to calculate the mean utilities given the current value of
the non-linear taste parameters.18 Second, given values of the ρξ parameters, which are included
in the set of non-linear parameters, the value of the linear demand parameters (which include all
of the market-format ﬁxed eﬀects) can be found using the ﬁrst-order conditions for minimizing the
GMM objective function deﬁned below as suggested by Nevo (2000).19 Finally, the innovations are
calculated and these are used to form the sample moments.
5.2.2 Additional Demographic Moments
As illustrated by Petrin (2002) additional information is useful in estimating the non-linear taste
parameters. I add two sets of moments. The ﬁrst set match the proportion of a station’s audience in
ﬁve age, gender or ethnic groups (females, 12-24, 25-49, blacks and Hispanics) with those reported for
each format by Arbitron in its Radio Today publications for Spring 2003, 2004 and 2005. The numbers
reported by Arbitron are averages for stations in the format across the largest 100 markets.20,21 The
moments are
E[Zdsfmt( \ Pdsfmt(Γ) − Pdf t)] = 0 (16)
17Speciﬁcally I include period t and t − 1 format interactions with the number of other AM stations in the format,
the number of other FM stations in the format and the sum of the proportion of market covered by the signals of
other stations in the format. I also include the period t values for the proportion of blacks and Hispanics in the market
population interacted with format dummies. This gives a total of 80 additional instruments.
18I use 50 Halton draws for each of the 18 demographic groups in each market-quarter (900 overall) and then calculate
market shares by weighting each demographic group appropriately. I also use independent draws across market-quarters,
which is appropriate as the Arbitron ratings panel varies across from quarter-to-quarter.
19This is possible because the additional moments I deﬁne below only depend on the δs and the value of the non-linear
taste parameters.
20I also have age and gender-speciﬁc share data on listenership to individual stations in Spring 2006. I do not use
this data because shares are not reported when they are too small, introducing a selection problem into the demand
estimation. However, the shares for larger stations, where less data is missing is similar to the averages that I use, and
the demand coeﬃcients are similar using the station-speciﬁc share data and ignoring the selection problem.
21For blacks and Hispanics the numbers are calculated using the subset of markets where Arbitron tracks ethnic and
racial listening.
20where Zdsfmt is an indicator equal to one if station-quarter st is in format f and in a market m used
by Arbitron in calculating its reported proportions.
The second set of moments match total time spent listening by blacks and Hispanics to those
reported by Arbitron for a set of markets in Fall 2004,
E[Zemt( \ TSLemt(Γ) − TSLemt)] = 0 (17)
where Zemt is an indicator for a reported market.
5.2.3 Objective Function
The moments are stacked into a vector G(Γ,ρ ξ). The objective function is
min
Γ,ρξ G(Γ,ρ ξ)0WG(Γ,ρ ξ) (18)
where W is a weighting matrix. Following Hansen (1982) I use a two-step procedure where W is the
identity matrix in the ﬁrst step and the inverse of the covariance matrix of the moments calculated at
the ﬁrst step parameter values in the second step. Analytic derivatives are used to speed the search.
5.3 First Step: Revenue Function
The revenue function is estimated using BIAfn’s estimates of annual station revenues and the pre-
dictions of demographic-speciﬁc station listenership from the estimated listener demand model. The
empirical speciﬁcation uses average revenues per listener as the dependent variable and allows for the
fact that years (y) contain more than one period.22
Rsmy =
P









22I use average revenues per listener as the dependent variable as these are similar across markets of diﬀerent sizes,
whereas total revenues are much larger in larger markets.
21The additively separable error does not have a structural interpretation - one might think of it as
measurement error in BIAfn’s estimates - and the function is estimated by non-linear least squares.23
5.4 First Step: Station Policy Functions
Stations’ equilibrium strategies can be inferred from the probabilities that they make diﬀerent format
choices conditional on the observed state variables. In an ideal world these probabilities would
be estimated non-parametrically. However, despite the large amount of data available, the size of
the state space makes a non-parametric approach infeasible. I therefore assume that the choice
probabilities can be adequately approximated using a multinomial logit model where the explanatory
variables are functions of the state variables as well as controls for the eﬀects of ownership. This
approach is also used by Ryan (2005), Ryan and Tucker (2006) and Beresteanu and Ellickson (2006)
and it has the advantage that the plausibility of the coeﬃcient estimates can easily be veriﬁed.
Both the multinomial format choice model and the revenue function have estimates from the de-
mand model as explanatory variables. It is not feasib l et oe s t i m a t ea l lo ft h e s em o d e l ss i m u l t a n e o u s l y
but I calculate corrected standard errors by expressing the ﬁrst order conditions of the non-linear
least squares and maximum likelihood estimators as moment conditions and applying the two-step
estimator cited in Ho (2006).
5.5 First Step: Demographic Transitions
The process controlling the growth of ethnic/racial populations is estimated using the County Popu-
lation Estimates. To prevent changes in very small population groups having an excessive eﬀect on
the estimates, I only use observations on those groups with at least a 5% share of market population.
23The key assumption is that format choices are not made in anticipation of future shocks to per listener revenues
which might diﬀer across formats.
225.6 Second Step: Estimation of Sunk Repositioning Costs
The parameters θ1 (mean sunk repositioning costs), θ2 (ﬁxed costs of being on-air) and σ (the scaling
parameter of the εFs/heterogeneity of sunk costs) are estimated in the second step using a moment
inequality estimator.
5.6.1 Estimating the Value Function
The inequalities are formed using the necessary equilibrium condition that a station’s actual strategy





−s,θ,σ) ≥ 0 ∀ς0
s (20)
Vs(S|ςs,ς∗
−s,θ) is a linear-in-parameters value function with four components representing the value
of expected future revenues, ﬁxed costs, switching costs and εs given strategies and future transitions
































and expectations are taken with respect to future transitions of the state variables given strategies.
Bajari et al. (2007) describe how to formulate unbiased estimates of R, S, F, εF using forward
simulation. Appendix A describes my forward simulation procedure in detail. The logit assumption
allows the expected value of εF
st(fst+1) to be calculated analytically using the choice probabilities.
R, S, F, εF are calculated for a station’s actual strategy and a set of alternative strategies which I
describe below.
235.6.2 Pakes et al. (2006)
Given estimates of the value function, several estimators could be used to estimate the parameters. I
choose Pakes et al. (2006)’s moment inequality estimator because it can provide consistent estimates
even when there is simulation error in the estimated value function. Allowing for simulation error
is important as it is prohibitively expensive to do enough simulations to eﬀectively eliminate the
simulation error from each observation.24
General Pakes et al. (2006) formulation. Pakes et al. (2006) consider estimating parameters
using the necessary condition that a ﬁrm s’s expected proﬁts from using its actual strategy (or,
depending on the setting, using its chosen action) ς∗






−s,x)|Is] ≥ 0 (22)
where x are variables aﬀecting proﬁts and Is is ﬁrm s’s information set at the time it chooses its
strategy.
The researcher is assumed to have an estimate of π(ςs,ς∗
−s,x),r (ςs,ς∗
−s,x 0;θ),w h e r ex0 are vari-
ables observed by the econometrician and θ are parameters. They deﬁne two sources of diﬀerence
between π and r, ν1,s,ςs and ν2,s,ςs
π(ςs,ς∗
−s,x)=r(ςs,ς∗
−s,x 0;θ)+ν1,s,ςs + ν2,s,ςs (23)
ν1,s,ςs is assumed to have an unconditional mean of zero, to be independent of Is and not to aﬀect s’s
choice of strategy. ν1,s,ςs can include the econometrician’s error in measuring proﬁts. On the other
hand ν2,s,ςs i sk n o w nb yt h eﬁrm and potentially aﬀects its choice of strategy.
24Simulations are computationally costly because a random coeﬃcients demand model and multinomial choice problems
for as many as 50 stations have to be solved in each period. Many simulations are required to remove the simulation
error because market demographics, qualities and format choices can evolve in many diﬀerent ways. On average, I
found that it required an average of just over 7,000 simulation paths for the estimate of expected future revenues to
converge to within 1% of its true value (estimated using 11,000 simulations). Instead I use 220 forward simulations per
observation and use an estimator which allows for simulation error.
24As is standard in the dynamic games literature, I assume that I observe the same state space as the
ﬁrms. As a result there is no v2 when the value function Vs is deﬁned prior to the private information
εFs being realized. This case corresponds to Pakes et al.’s Example 1 and several of their empirical
examples. Substituting (23) into (22) and using E(ν1,s,ςs|Is)=0
E[r(ς∗
s,ς∗
−s,x 0;θ) − r(ς0
s,ς∗
−s,x 0;θ)|zs] ≥ 0 (24)
where zs ∈ Is.
(24) can be turned into an estimating moment inequality by specifying a set of non-negative
















The ν1 errors are “averaged out” across observations. The number of moment inequalities can be
increased by expanding the set of instruments h(zs) or increasing the number of alternative strategies
considered. The parameters are estimated by ﬁnding the θs which satisfy the inequalities (or minimize
violations if there are no parameters for which all the inequalities hold). Estimation is particularly
simple when r is a linear function of θ. Pakes et al. prove consistency of the estimator (as the number
of observations increases) and show how to construct two types of conﬁdence interval.25
Applying Pakes et al. (2006) to Estimate Repositioning Costs. In my setting, the r(.)s
are the simulated value functions and the ν1s are additively separable simulation errors in measuring
station revenues (I will come back to simulation error in the other components of expected payoﬀsi na
moment). There are three parameters to estimate, θ1,θ2 and σ. I perform the estimation separately
for six groups of markets of diﬀerent sizes, so that the parameters can vary freely between the groups.
25It is not known how to analytically correct these conﬁdence intervals for estimation error in the ﬁrst step. The most
obvious solution would be to bootstrap the conﬁdence intervals by repeating the forward simulations for diﬀerent draws
from the ﬁrst step parameters. This would be very time consuming and I have not done it. However, I do examine how
the second stage estimates change when I change the speciﬁcation for the transition of unobserved station quality which
directly aﬀects how attractive switching is. The second stage parameter estimates change relatively little in this case.
25I use the simplest possible application of the Pakes et al. methodology to my setting. I deﬁne the
h(zs)s to be a set of constants and consider four alternative policies which provide lower and upper
bounds on θ1, and upper bounds on θ2 and σ. I add the natural restrictions that θ2 ≥ 0 (ﬁxed costs
are positive) and σ ≥ 0 (the scale parameter on the εFs are non-negative). As a result, the system
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⎦ ≥ 0 for 4 alternative ς0
s (26)
θ2 ≥ 0,σ≥ 0
A nice feature of these inequalities is that additively separable simulation error in the S, F,a n dεF
terms should also be averaged out across observations.
I now describe the alternative strategies. A strategy speciﬁes a set of cutoﬀsf o rt h eεFs, as
functions of the observed state variables, which lead to diﬀerent format choices. A strategy implies
a probability for each format choice in each state prior to the realization of the εFs. My alternative
strategies vary the choice probabilities and, equivalently, imply diﬀerent cutoﬀsf o rt h eεFs.
The logic behind each of the alternative policies can be seen writing the inequality as
(R∗ − R0) − θ1(S∗ − S0) − θ2(F∗ − F0)+σ(εF∗ − εF0) ≥ 0 (27)








































if (F0 − F∗) < 0 (31)
26Consider an alternative strategy which raises expected revenues (R)a tt h ec o s to fi n c r e a s i n gt h e
number of switches (S). The fact that this strategy is not chosen implies a lower bound on the sunk
repositioning costs as a function of θ2 and σ (inequality 28). On the other hand, the fact that a
strategy which reduces switching but also reduces future revenues is not chosen provides an upper
bound on sunk costs (inequality 29). I operationalize the ﬁrst alternative by changing the station’s
strategy so that the probability that it remains in its current format falls by 0.05 in every state with
the probabilities of every alternative format scaled up proportionally. The second alternative has the
station never switching formats. The results are similar varying the size of the changes in strategy
unless the changes are very small (as I discuss below).
Pakes et al. provide a graphical interpretation of their procedure (p. 55). Figure 4(a) shows
the bounds constructed using these alternative strategies in (θ1,σ) s p a c ew h e r et h ei n e q u a l i t i e sa r e
averaged over stations in markets with between 3 and 5 million people and θ2 =0 .A f o r m a t s w i t c h
tends to yield a higher value of εF,s ot h a ta sσ increases higher sunk costs are required to rationalize
why stations rarely switch formats. This causes the bounds to slope upwards.
An upper bound on σ can be found using an alternative policy which increases εF while reducing
future revenues, holding switching roughly constant (inequality 30). I construct an appropriate alter-
native strategy using a feature of the multinomial logit choice model. For a given set of alternatives,
the expected value of the εF associated with the chosen alternative increases as the choice probabil-
ities are made more equal.26 The speciﬁc alternative strategy which I consider leads to the station
not changing the probability that it remains in its current format but equalizing the probabilities of
choosing each alternative format.27 Figure 4(b) adds this bound to the diagram. The resulting upper
bounds on (θ1,σ) are ($47m, $4.7m) and the lower bounds are ($6.4m, $0m). Figure 5 shows that
the diagrams constructed for other market groups are qualitatively very similar, although the scale of
26This results from the εs being iid across choices. An agent who chooses the alternative with the highest ε (disre-
garding other features of the choice) will choose each alternative with equal probability.
27As p e c i ﬁc example may help to provide more intuition. AM stations rarely choose Rock and frequently choose
News/Talk. This presumably reﬂects the fact that AM stations expect higher revenues in News than in Rock. On the
other hand, if AM stations simply maximized the ε
Fs associated with their format choices there would choose Rock with
the same probability as News. I can estimate how much lower expected revenues and higher expected ε
Fsw o u l db ei f
an AM station was to choose News and Rock with equal probability and this lets me construct an upper bound on σ.
27the axes varies with market size.
An upper bound on per-period ﬁxed costs can be found by considering an alternative strategy
which reduces the number of periods the station is on-air (F) while also reducing revenues (inequality
31). The alternative strategy increases the probability than an active station goes oﬀ-air by 0.05,
with the other choice probabilities reduced proportionally.28
5.6.3 Alternative Second Step Estimators
I use the moment inequality approach because it allows me to consistently estimate the parameters
even when there is some error in the simulated payoﬀs of each station. Estimators such as Maximum
Likelihood (using observed station choices) or moment estimators which calculate choice probabilities
will not produce consistent estimates because they use non-linear transformations of the simulated
payoﬀs.
A disadvantage of the moment inequality approach is that it produces only bounds on the pa-
rameters. However, one can approximate moment equalities (representing the ﬁrst-order conditions
of the ﬁrm’s maximization problem) using small perturbations of station strategies. I have exper-
imented with this approach and when the perturbations are not too small it produces estimates of
repositioning costs which are similar to the (reasonable) upper bound estimates produced using the
inequalities. When very small perturbations are used, the results become sensitive to the number of
forward simulations. This suggests that the larger changes in strategy considered when calculating
the moment inequalities may also be helpful in dealing with simulation errors.
6R e s u l t s
This section presents the empirical results. I estimate the model using data from Spring 1997 to
Spring 2006 for 100 markets (listed in Table 5) where less than 6% of radio listening is to out of
28A lower bound on per-period ﬁxed costs can be estimated by increasing the probability that oﬀ-air stations become
active. However, many of my oﬀ-air stations have lost their licenses or are waiting to be licensed so they may prevented
from entering even if it was proﬁt a b l et od os o .
28market stations.29 I limit the sample in this way to avoid modelling interactions between markets.
In the second step I simulate the model for each station observed in the data in Fall 2004.
I also make two additional adjustments to the data. First, radio listening has declined since the
mid-1980s and real revenues per listener have increased. Since 2001 these trends have roughly oﬀset
each other. To avoid modelling these trends I remove the national trend from the share data and,
when simulating the model forward, I assume that real revenues per listener will remain ﬁxed at their
2004 levels.
Second, BIAfn does not report the market shares of stations which fail to meet Arbitron’s Minimum
Reporting Standards (Arbitron (2002)). These stations have low market shares (generally less than
0.3% of radio listening each), but they can account for as many as 25% of all stations. To avoid
imputing shares for such a large proportion of the sample, I drop stations which are missing data for
over half of the sample periods (17% of stations) and impute a share for the remainder based on how
many quarters are missing and the share of the smallest reported station in the market-quarter.
6.1 First Step: Listener Demand
Table 6 presents the estimated coeﬃcients from the demand model and the processes governing station
quality.30 Speciﬁcation A is the model described above. The demographic format taste parameters
show the expected pattern, with, for example, females preferring Adult Contemporary and disliking
Rock, and most of these coeﬃcients are precisely estimated. The standard deviations of the ran-
dom components of format tastes are small and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This ﬁnding is
consistent with demographics capturing most of the systematic diﬀerences in individuals’ tastes for
diﬀerent types of programming within markets.31 The standard deviation of the random coeﬃcient
29A little over 12% of stations in this subsample of markets have listeners in other markets. I assume that stations
do not consider revenues they get from listeners in other markets. This is plausible because local advertisers will place
less value on reaching listeners in other markets (the BIAfn revenue data suggests that an out of market listener counts
f o ra b o u t2 0 %o ft h ev a l u eo fah o m em a r k e tl i s t e n e r ) .
30The parameters which are not listed include a set of time dummies. The time coeﬃcients are all small and
statistically insigniﬁcant (this reﬂects the fact that I take out the trend in radio listenership when calculating the share
data). When I simulate forward I ignore their eﬀects.
31The market-format ﬁxed eﬀects should capture systematic diﬀerences in format preferences across markets.
29on the commercial radio constant is also quite small, indicating that there is a reasonable degree of
substitution with the outside good which includes non-commercial stations and the fringe stations
which are too small to be included in the sample.
The coeﬃcients on the ﬁxed station quality characteristics are sensible, with greater signal coverage
and more powerful transmitters associated with higher station quality. The small number of out of
market stations are estimated to be of lower quality, and the coeﬃcient on the dummy included for
stations with imputed shares is also negative as these stations, by deﬁnition, have small shares. AM
band stations are, as expected, estimated to have higher quality in the News format than formats
such as Rock and Urban. However, AM stations are estimated to have higher quality in Adult
Contemporary and CHR than in News, even though there are very few AM AC or CHR stations.
The ﬁnal part of the table reports the coeﬃcients for the processes controlling unobserved station
quality. The ρξ parameters are less than one so that the processes are stationary. While quality is
more persistent for stations staying in the same format, it is also persistent (ρ
ξ
2 =0 .7)f o rs t a t i o n s
which switch formats. The μ
ξ
2 coeﬃcient indicates the quality falls on average in the period following a
switch even though listenership increases. However, this quality decline is not statistically signiﬁcant:
quality is largely transferred across formats.
Figure 1 shows that listenership increases for two periods following a switch, rather than adjusting
to a new level immediately. Speciﬁcation B captures this eﬀect by adding an additional constant to the
quality evolution process (4) for stations which changed formats one period earlier. The coeﬃcient is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant, with the other transition parameters remaining almost the same
as in speciﬁcation A (this also applies to the other coeﬃcients which I do not report). The most
obvious interpretation of this increase in quality is that listenership increases as listeners become aware
of the station’s new format with some additional beneﬁt arising because of novelty or from investments
undertaken at the time of switching which have not been modelled. Allowing for this quality increase
tends to makes switching more attractive and, a result, increases how large sunk repositioning costs
have to be to explain why stations rarely switch. In what follows I use the speciﬁcation B results,
30but show how the second step parameters change if I use speciﬁcation A instead.
Figures 6(a) and (b) show the pdfs of the innovations in unobserved station quality (the residuals
from the quasi-diﬀerenced moments) and Figure 6(c) shows the pdf of quality itself (ξsmt). All of
the distributions are close to bell-shaped with more weight in the tails than one would expect given
normal distributions. Most of the weight in the tails of the innovation distributions comes from
small stations for whom shares and changes in share may be aﬀected by my imputation or Arbitron’s
mismeasurement. In the analysis which follows I draw the innovations in quality from the empirical
distributions of innovations for stations with shares above the 25th percentile, although the ﬁto ft h e
model is very similar using a wide range of cutoﬀs.32
I can also compute how well the demand model and innovation processes perform at predicting
how listenership changes over time. To do this, I use the estimates of station quality in period t,
simulate (one set of) changes in station quality and calculate stations’ market shares in their t +1
formats with t+1market demographics. Figure 7 and Table 7 compare the changes in share seen in
the data with those simulated from the model. The actual and simulated distributions match closely
for both switchers and non-switchers.
One can also calculate the model’s performance at predicting changes for individual stations.
This can be done either by using just one simulation or using multiple simulations (I use 20). The
correlation between these average predicted changes and the changes seen in the actual data for format
s w i t c h e r si s0 . 5 6 . 33 The correlation for stations remaining in the same format is lower, 0.14. This is
not surprising as non-switchers are less aﬀected by the type of structural change in product positioning
which the estimated demand model is designed to capture.
32If no cut-oﬀ is used the changes in share for larger stations have greater variance than those observed in the data.
The ﬁt of the model is also similar when separate innovation processes are estimated for small and large stations. The
demand system parameters are also essentially identical in this case.
33As a benchmark one can compare this correlation with the correlation between a single simulation and the mean
from 20 diﬀerent simulations. This correlation is 0.62, indicating that the model only does a slightly worse job of
predicting what happens than would be expected if the model was perfectly speciﬁed.
316.2 First Step: Revenue Function
Table 8 reports the coeﬃcients from several speciﬁcations of the revenue function. The revenue
function is estimated using BIAfn’s revenue data and estimates of audience composition from the
demand model. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation assumes a price per listener which does not vary with the size
of a station’s listenership but does vary with listener demographics. Females are estimated to be
more valuable than males, listeners aged 25-49 to be more valuable than older or younger listeners
and whites to be more valuable than blacks or Hispanics. These demographic coeﬃcients are similar
across the speciﬁcations. The bottom section of the table provides some statistics on the performance
of the revenue model in predicting changes in annual revenues given the changes in listenership. The
simplest speciﬁcation underestimates the average increase in (nominal) revenues for non-switchers and
overestimates them for switchers, although the correlations between predicted and observed changes
in revenues are reasonable in both cases.
The second speciﬁcation allows for eﬀects of format competition, common ownership as well as
an additional eﬀect on revenues in the year following a change in format (when a station may carry
fewer commercials or discount commercial time while it develops relationships with new advertisers).
Common ownership with an additional station in the format increases revenues per listener by 2%.34
Competition reduces revenues by a small and barely signiﬁcant amount (0.2%). The absence of a
competition eﬀect is consistent with advertising prices being set in a broader advertising market. The
speciﬁcation also reveals a large, direct eﬀect of format switching on station revenues as prices per
listener are estimated to fall by 14% in the year following the format switch.
The last two speciﬁcations allow for prices per listener to vary with the number of listeners. This is
partly motivated by Fisher et al.’s (1980) ﬁnding that advertising prices charged by local TV stations
increase with audience size. The third speciﬁcation allows for prices to vary with the diﬀerence
between the station’s market share and the market average. Consistent with Fisher et al., prices per
34This could be rationalized by (i) common owners being able to oﬀer advertisers bundles of ads on diﬀerent stations
which allows them to extract more advertiser surplus or (ii) by being able to exercise some market power over either
listeners (making them listen to more commercials) or advertisers. In either case the common ownership eﬀect is
relatively small.
32listener increase with station size and allowing this eﬀect increases the predicted change in revenues
for format switchers, as they tend to gain listeners. The predicted change in revenues for switchers
and non-switchers is lower than the observed changes by similar amounts.
The ﬁnal speciﬁcation allows the prices per listener in each of the 18 demographic groups to vary
with the proportion of the station’s listenership who are in that group. This is motivated by the
idea that advertisers may value more homogenous audiences. However, the coeﬃcient is negative and
signiﬁcant. There is no obvious explanation for a negative eﬀect and in using the revenue function
below I use the results from the third speciﬁcation.
6.3 First Step: Station Policy Functions
Table 9 reports the coeﬃcients from the multinomial logit estimates of station strategies. An advantage
of the parametric speciﬁcation is that it is easy to see whether the signs of the coeﬃcients are sensible.
The ﬁrst part of the table shows the coeﬃcients on variables that one should think of as aﬀecting
the intrinsic attractiveness of a format. The pattern of coeﬃcients is sensible. For example, large and
growing Hispanic populations make stations more likely to choose the Spanish format. Larger black
populations make stations more likely to choose Urban and Religious formats, although black growth
is not estimated to have signiﬁcant eﬀects. This is probably because black growth rates show less
variation than Hispanic growth rates during my sample period. The coeﬃcients on the measures of
market-format attractiveness (the market-format ﬁxed eﬀects from the demand system) are positive,
as one would expect, but they are generally insigniﬁcant.35
The second part reports the coeﬃcients on variables reﬂecting competition from other stations.
As expected, most of the coeﬃcients are negative (more competition makes it less attractive for a
station to choose the format). A station is also more likely to stay in a format if it is the largest
station and, in general, stations with larger shares are less likely to switch. The third part lists the
35I have to impute qualities for market-formats in which stations are never observed. Religious formats in markets
outside of the South and Spanish formats in markets with few Hispanics make up the majority of the cases. I assume
that market-format attractiveness in these markets is equal to the 25% percentile of markets where attractiveness can
be estimated. The results do not appear to be sensitive to the percentile used.
33coeﬃcients on interactions between format and band. I allow the coeﬃcients to diﬀer depending on
whether stations are already in the format (Stay x) or are in a diﬀerent format (Switch x). The AM
xS w i t c hc o e ﬃcients are consistent with the pattern in Table 2 that AM stations are more likely to
switch to talk programming (News and Religious). The market size interactions indicate that there
is less switching, conditional on the other variables, in larger markets.
The ﬁnal part reports the coeﬃcients on the ownership variables included as controls, as well as
a miscellaneous selection of other variables. The national ownership variables indicate that stations
are more likely to switch stations into formats where they own other stations (in any market). The
magnitude of the eﬀect is largest for Spanish, suggesting that there may be larger economies of scope
from operating stations in the same language. There is also a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect that stations
which have undergone recent ownership changes are more likely to switch formats, suggesting that the
optimal format choice may diﬀer from owner-to-owner. However, the within market ownership eﬀects
are much weaker: a station is slightly (but not signiﬁcantly) more likely to leave a format where it has
sister stations, but it is also more likely to switch to a format where it has sister stations. There are
no signiﬁcant eﬀects of other ﬁrms owning multiple stations in a format. Stations which have switched
formats in the previous year (Recent Switch x) are slightly, but not signiﬁcantly, more likely to make
af u r t h e rs w i t c h .
One can also calculate a pseudo-R2 statistic by comparing the maximized log-likelihood with the
log-likelihood when the model only contains a constant for staying in the same format. The additional
variables explain just over 14% of the variation in station switching decisions. This compares favorably
with the pseudo-R2s reported in Ryan (2005) and Beresteanu and Ellickson (2006).
346.4 First Step: Demographic Transitions
I estimate the demographic transition process using data from all markets, not just the 100 markets







and the standard deviation of νD
emt is 0.0100. This implies that average long-run population growth
of 1.5% per year.
6.5 Second Step Estimates: Sunk Repositioning Costs
With the ﬁrst step estimates in hand, I use the moment inequality estimator described above to bound
sunk repositioning costs. Table 10(a) show the bounds and associated conﬁdence intervals for six
diﬀerent groups of markets which diﬀer in size. The estimates assume that the parameters are the
same for each station within each market group. In LA and Chicago, the lower and upper bound
estimates of θ1 are $700,000 (4% of annual revenues for the average station) and $81 million (over 4
times annual revenues).
The upper bound estimates of mean sunk repositioning costs may seem implausibly large, but
if the εFs represent heterogeneity in repositioning costs then the mean will not reﬂect repositioning
c o s t sp a i db ys t a t i o n sw h i c hc h o o s et os w i t c hf o r m ats. The table also reports the estimated average
repositioning costs of stations switching formats during the sample period. This is calculated as the
expected value of θ1 −σ(εF
a −εF
b ) where εF
a is the εF associated with the chosen format and εF
b is the
εF associated with remaining in the station’s current format.36 A st h ee s t i m a t eo fσ is zero at the
lower bound estimate of θ1, the estimated lower bound of repositioning costs paid is just θ1.O nt h e
other hand, the upper bound average sunk repositioning cost of switchers is much lower than θ1.I n
LA and Chicago the upper bound estimate is $11.5 million or 64% of annual revenues for the average
36This expected value is estimated by simulation using the conditional choice probabilities estimated in the ﬁrst stage.
35station. Total sunk repositioning costs paid, at the upper bound estimates, by format switchers
in LA and Chicago during the sample period are estimated to be $727 million. During the same
time period total revenues in these markets were around $16.3 billion. The average cost of reduced
revenues following the format switch was $1.9 million ($120 million total).
These estimates of repositioning costs can be compared with the “back of the envelope” estimates
of the present discounted value of revenue gains accruing to switchers reported for 5 markets in Table
3. For Chicago, the estimated revenue gains per switcher was $29 million which is greater than the
upper bound estimate of sunk repositioning costs paid by switchers. This is not surprising as there
are several reasons for believing that the back of the envelope assumptions should lead to estimates
which are too high. For example, the marginal switcher should expect to gain fewer listeners than the
average switcher used in Table 3; a switcher may not expect to maintain its increase in share forever;
and, many of the observed switchers move to formats such as Spanish where listeners are less valuable
to advertisers.
The upper bound estimates fall as market size decreases. This pattern is expected, as there is at
least as much switching in smaller markets as larger ones, even though station revenues are smaller.37
It also consistent with marketing costs being a large component of sunk repositioning costs as the
costs of advertising per listener share point will be higher in markets with larger populations. In
addition, a station may also have to market itself to a greater number of potential advertisers. On
the other hand, the costs of replacing staﬀ or programming libraries or of hiring format consultants
would seem likely to be similar across markets, suggesting that these costs are less important.
I assume that ﬁxed costs are only paid by stations in periods when they are on-air. The upper
bound estimate of these costs is identiﬁed from the fact that if they are too high then stations would
prefer to switch to Dark which we rarely see.38 In most of the market groups the upper bound
37The lower bound estimates suggest that sunk switching costs are small in all markets (the second market group is
an exception) which would also explain why we can observe switching in smaller markets.
38I assume that a station’s unobserved quality evolves in the same way when it is Dark as it does in active formats,
except that I assume that it does not experience the jump in quality in the second period following a switch. This
assumption also tends to make it less attractive for a station to switch to Dark.
36estimate is around 66% of the revenues of the average station, being a slightly higher percentage in
smaller markets. These estimates are consistent with measures of revenues and operating income
reported by publicly-traded radio companies.39
The modelling assumption that a radio station’s costs do not vary with its listenership is not
quite right. Licensing fees for music and syndicated programming increase with station revenues.40
Although it is diﬃcult to identify stations’ marginal costs using only information on format choices
and revenues, the way in which the estimates of sunk repositioning costs would change if stations were
only to keep a proportion of any increase in revenues as proﬁt is clear from inequalities (28)-(30). For
example, if 90% of any revenue increase is kept then the constants on the right-hand side of inequalities
would be multiplied by 0.9, reducing the estimated values of θ1 and σ.
Table 10(b) shows how the estimated parameters change when quality transition speciﬁcation
A is used, so that there is no systematic increase in unobserved station quality following a format
switch. As a result switching becomes less attractive and lower repositioning costs rationalize how rare
switching is. However, the change in the bounds of θ1 is relatively small. For example, in markets
with between 500,000 and 1 million people, the lower bound estimate of θ1 falls from $100,000 to
-$500,000 and the upper bound estimate falls from $10.3 million to $9.1 million.
6.6 Applications of the Model
While the richness of the estimated model prevents me from resolving it to conduct certain counter-
factuals (e.g., the eﬀects of a repositioning subsidy), it is possible to use the ﬁrst stage estimates to
learn about some of the eﬀects of format switching and how sensitive format choices are to changes
in the environment (state space). I consider two examples here: ﬁrst, how switching observed during
t h es a m p l ep e r i o da ﬀected listeners and revenues, and second, how sensitive positioning is to changes
39For example, Clear Channel reported that operating income was 38% of revenues for its radio stations in its 2004
10-K ﬁling. Cumulus, a radio company operating in medium-sized and smaller markets, reported that operating income
was 25% of revenues.
40The performing rights agencies ASCAP, BMI and SESAC charge broadcast radio stations a proportion of their
revenues. For example, ASCAP charged stations with annual revenues above $150,000 a rate of 1.65% of revenues for
a blanket license in the late 1990s (http://www.ascap.com/licensing/radio/radiofaq.html). Syndicated programming is
typically sold by allowing the syndicator to sell a certain number of minutes of advertising time on a station.
37in market demographics (relatively permanent demand shocks).
6.6.1 Eﬀects of Format Switching 1997-2006
Iu s et h ed e m a n da n dq u a l i t yt r a n s i t i o ne s t i m a t e sto estimate how listenership and revenues changed
due to observed format switching. To be precise, I compare listenership and stations revenues in
Spring 2006 given observed format switching with a simulated estimate of what they would have been
if stations had remained in their Spring 1997 formats but market demographics had evolved in the
same way as they did in the data. I report changes in per period revenues (i.e., ﬂows) rather than
discounted future values.
The upper part of Table 11 shows the diﬀerence in listenership between these two scenarios for
seven demographic groups. In larger markets, observed format switching led to quite large increases
in the listenership of Hispanic and blacks, small increases for women and small decreases for whites
and people over 50. The increase in listenership of Hispanics is consistent with the 72% increase in
the number of Spanish language stations in the ﬁrst three groups of markets. The increase in black
listenership may seem more surprising but it is explained by the 28% and 17% increases in the number
of Urban and Contemporary Hit Radio stations which are popular with blacks. The decline in older
listenership is explained by the decrease in the number of Other Music (e.g., Easy Listening, Variety,
Middle of the Road and Jazz) stations which attract mainly older listeners.
Format switching caused broader increases in listenership in smaller markets. This is because
there was more switching out of Dark (entry) in these markets and these switches unambiguously
increase the listenership of every demographic group.41
The lower part of Table 11 shows how format switching eﬀects the revenues of switching and non-
switching stations. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) argue that when an additional station enters a radio
market listeners are taken from existing stations. This externality can lead to “excess entry”. On the
other hand, when a station switches between active formats it frequently only changes which group of
41In the ﬁr s tt w om a r k e tg r o u p st h e r ea r e1a n d5e x a m p l e so fs t a t i o n sm o v i n gf r o mD a r k ,w h e r e a st h e r e3 3 ,2 5 ,2 5
and 47 cases respectively in the smaller market groups.
38stations it takes listeners from. In larger markets, there is little switching from Dark (entry) so that
the increase in revenues for switchers is not associated with a signiﬁcant net change in the revenues of
non-switchers. Figure 8 shows the distribution of changes in revenue for non-switchers in the second
group of markets, with stations facing more competition as a result of format switching tending to lose
revenues. In smaller markets there is more switching from Dark. The entering stations obviously gain
revenues, but their entry reduces the revenues of both non-switchers and stations switching between
active formats.
6.6.2 Sensitivity to Demand Shocks
I use observed station strategies to examine how sensitive format choices are to shocks in demand.
Table 4 (long diﬀerenced IV) shows that format availability does respond to the relatively slow changes
in market demographics seen in the data.42 Here, I illustrate the response implied by the estimated
policy function to a larger change in demand using the Minneapolis-St. Paul market as an example.
In Fall 2004 there were no Urban stations in this market and only a small (5.5%) black population.
I shock the market by making 20% of the white population black, and then simulate the model to see
how quickly we should expect stations to enter the Urban format.43 Based on the demographics of
the shocked market, a between market regression predicts that there should be 3.4 Urban stations.
Figure 9 shows what happens to the number of Urban stations when I simulate the model for
twenty years 100 times. On average, there is one Urban station within 2 years, two Urban stations
within 4 years and three after 8 years. After this point, the number remains stable at between 3 and 4
stations. Thus, despite the presence of signiﬁcant repositioning costs, the results suggest that format
availability adjusts quite rapidly to demand shocks. This relatively rapid adjustment is interesting
because many policy analyses (e.g., of mergers) considers whether repositioning could take place in a
42Waldfogel (2003) also shows that there are more black (Hispanic)-orientated stations in markets with more blacks
(Hispanics) using cross-sectional data.
43I assume that the growth rates of the black and white populations evolve from their pre-existing (i.e., non-shocked)
levels, so that there is not a massive spike in black growth. Of course, a limitation of this exercise is that the policy
function can only approximate station policies at points seen in the data. Once we step to points in the state space well
outside the range in the data, the approximations may be less reliable.
39period of one to two years.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The last 15 years have seen considerable progress in modelling both static and dynamic consumer
demand for diﬀerentiated products. However, there has been relatively little work modelling the
supply of diﬀerentiated products, and this is a potential problem for understanding the eﬀects of any
kind of shock which might lead to ﬁrms wanting to change the products that they oﬀer.
I estimate a dynamic model of commercial radio markets which provides insights into what drives
product repositioning as well as estimates of how expensive repositioning is for ﬁrms and how it aﬀects
listeners. I ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of two types of repositioning cost. First, stations tend to receive
lower revenues per listener following a format switch. This reduction is consistent with it taking
time for stations to develop relationships with a new set of advertisers. Second, there are sunk costs
associated with switching. There are many potential sources of these costs, such as marketing, hiring
format consultants, replacing staﬀ or updating the station’s programming library, but the fact that
they are larger in larger markets suggests that marketing costs may be the most important. For
stations which choose to switch formats these costs could be as large as one year’s revenues, but these
costs are not large enough to prevent markets adjusting quite quickly to changes in demand.
The quantitative results are speciﬁc to the commercial radio industry which is one of the industries
where the antitrust authorities have considered whether repositioning could constrain market power
following mergers. More generally, the paper provides a framework for examining repositioning in
any industry with evolving product variety. The framework can handle many ﬁrms and numerous
types of product which appeal to diﬀerent kinds of consumer.
Understanding the potential role of repositioning following mergers was one of the primary moti-
vations for this paper. My results suggest that radio stations may only switch formats if they expect
to realize quite signiﬁcant gains. However, it is important to acknowledge that multi-product own-
ership is currently modelled in a limited way. In particular, I control for the eﬀects of multi-product
40ownership on stations’ policies but I do not explicitly model the dynamics of product selection by
multi-product ﬁrms and I do not model how ﬁrms expect product ownership to change in the future.
Modelling multiproduct ﬁrms in a more sophisticated way and estimating how mergers aﬀect product
selection through market power, business cannibalization and economies of scope, both within and
across markets, are important topics for future research.
41References
[1] Ackerberg, Daniel A., Kevin Caves and Garth Frazer (2005), “Structural Identiﬁcation of Pro-
duction Functions”, mimeo, UCLA
[2] Aguirregabiria, Victor and Pedro Mira (2007), “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete
Games”, Econometrica, 75(1), 1-53
[3] Arbitron Company (2002), Arbitron Radio Market Report Reference Guide, New York, NY: Ar-
bitron Company
[4] Arbitron Company, Radio Today, various years, New York, NY: Arbitron Company
[5] Bayer, Christian and Falko Juessen (2006), “On the Dynamics of Interstate Migration: Migration
Costs and Self-Selection”, mimeo, University of Dortmund
[6] Bajari, Patrick, Lanier Benkard and Jonathan Levin (2007), “Estimating Dynamic Models of
Imperfect Competition”, Econometrica, 75(5), 1331-1370
[7] Beresteanu, Arie and Paul B. Ellickson (2006), “The Dynamics of Retail Oligopoly”, mimeo,
Duke University
[8] Bernard, Andrew, Stephen Redding and Peter Schott (2006), “Multi-Product Firms and Product
Switching”, NBER working paper 12293
[9] Berry, Steven T. (1994), “Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Diﬀerentiation”, RAND
Journal of Economics, 25(2), 242-262
[10] Berry, Steven T., James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1993), “Applications and Limitations of
Some Recent Advances in Empirical Industrial Organization: Price Indexes and the Analysis of
Environmental Change”, American Economic Review, 83(2), 240-246
[11] Berry, Steven T., James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1995), “Automobile Prices in Market Equi-
librium”, Econometrica, 63(4), 841-890
42[12] Berry, Steven T. and Joel Waldfogel (1999), “Free Entry and Social Ineﬃciency in Radio Broad-
casting”, RAND Journal of Economics, 30(2), 397-420
[13] Berry, Steven T. and Joel Waldfogel (2001), “Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence
from Radio Broadcasting”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 1009-1025
[14] Berry, Steven T., Michael Ostrovsky and Ariel Pakes (2007), “Simple Estimators for the Para-
meters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples)”, forthcoming, RAND Journal
of Economics
[15] BIA Financial Network, Inc. (2001), Media Access Pro User’s Manual, version 3.0, Chantilly,
VA: BIA Financial Network, Inc.
[16] Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond (2000), “GMM Estimation with Persistent Panel Data: An
Application to Production Functions”, Econometric Reviews, 19, 321-340
[17] Collard-Wexler, Allan (2005), “Plant Turnover and Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix Con-
crete Industry”, mimeo, Northwestern University
[18] Crawford, Gregory S. and Matthew Shum (2006), “The Welfare Eﬀects of Endogenous Quality
Choice: The Case of Cable Television”, mimeo, University of Arizona
[19] Draganaska, Michaela, Michael Mazzeo and Katja Seim (2006), “Modeling Joint Pricing and
Product Assortment Choices”, mimeo, Stanford University
[20] Doraszelski, Uli and Mark Satterthwaite (2003), “Foundations of Markov Perfect Industry Dy-
namics: Existence, Puriﬁcation and Multiplicity”, mimeo, Northwestern University
[21] Duncan, James H., Duncan’s American Radio, issues from Spring 1996 to Spring 2001
[22] Einav, Liran (2007), “Seasonality in the U.S. Motion Picture Industry”, forthcoming, RAND
Journal of Economics
43[23] Ericson, Richard and Ariel Pakes (1995), “Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for
Empirical Work”, Review of Economic Studies, 62(1), 53-82
[24] Federal Communications Commission (2001), Review of the Radio Industry, 2001,M a s sM e d i a
Bureau Policy and Rules Division, Washington DC: Federal Communications Commission
[25] Fisher, Franklin M., John F. McGowan and David S. Evans (1980), “The Audience-Revenue
Relationship for Local Television Stations”, Bell Journal of Economics, 11(2), 694-708
[26] Froeb, Luke, Amit Gandhi, Steven Tschantz and Gregory J. Werden (2007), “Post-Merger Prod-
uct Repositioning”, J o u r n a lo fI n d u s t r i a lE c o n o m i c s , forthcoming
[27] Gemici, Ahu (2007), “Family Migration and Labor Market Outcomes”, mimeo, University of
Pennsylvania
[28] Hansen, Lars Peter (1982), “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Esti-
mators”, Econometrica, 50(4), 1029-1054
[29] Hendel, Igal and Aviv Nevo (2006), “Measuring the Implications of Sales and Consumer Inventory
Behavior”, Econometrica, 74(6), 1637-1673
[30] Hitsch, Gunter J. (2006), “An Empirical Model of Optimal Dynamic Product Launch and Exit
Under Demand Uncertainty”, Marketing Science, 25(1), 25-50
[31] Ho, Katherine (2006), “The Welfare Eﬀects of Restricted Hospital Choice in the US Medical
Market”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21, 1039-1079
[32] Ho, Katherine (2007), “Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market”, mimeo,
Columbia University
[33] Holmes, Thomas J. (2007), “The Diﬀusion of Wal-Mart and the Economics of Density”, mimeo,
University of Minnesota
44[34] Hotz, V. Joseph and Robert A. Miller (1993), “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estima-
tion of Dynamic Models”, Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 497-529
[35] Hotz, V. Joseph, Robert A. Miller, Seth Sanders and Jeﬀrey Smith (1994), “A Simulation Esti-
mator for Dynamic Models of Discrete Choice”, Review of Economic Studies, 61(2), 265-89
[36] Ishii, Joy (2005), “Compatibility, Competition and Investment in Network Industries: ATM
Networks in the Banking Industry”, mimeo, Stanford University
[37] Kennan, John and James R. Walker (2006), “The Eﬀect of Expected Income on Individual
Migration Decisions”, mimeo, University of Wisconsin-Madison
[38] Klein, Joel I. (1997), “DOJ Analysis of Radio Mergers”, speech delivered in Washington, DC ,
February 19, 1997, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1055.pdf
[39] Levinsohn, James and Amil Petrin (2003), “Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to
Control for Unobservables”, Review of Economic Studies, 62(1), 317-341
[40] Macieira, Joao (2006), “Measuring the Eﬀects of Innovation Subsidies: The Case of Supercom-
puters”, mimeo, Northwestern University
[41] Mankiw, N. Gregory and Michael D. Whinston (1986), “Free Entry and Social Eﬃciency”, RAND
Journal of Economics, 17(1), 48-58
[42] Nevo, Aviv (2000), “A Practioner’s Guide to Estimation of Random-Coeﬃcients Logit Models of
Demand”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9(4), 513-548
[43] Olley, Steven and Ariel Pakes (1996), “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications
Industry”, Econometrica, 64(6), 1263-1295
[44] Pakes, Ariel, Jack Porter, Katherine Ho and Joy Ishii (2006), “Moment Inequalities and their
Application”, mimeo, Harvard University
45[45] Pesendorfer, Martin and Phillip Schmidt-Dengler (2003), “Identiﬁcation and Estimation of Dy-
namic Games”, NBER working paper 9726
[46] Petrin, Amil (2002), “Quantifying the Beneﬁts of New Products: The Case of the Minivan”,
Journal of Political Economy, 110(4), 705-729
[47] Romeo, Charles and Andrew Dick (2005), “The Eﬀect of Format Changes and Ownership Con-
solidation on Radio Station Outcomes”, mimeo, US Department of Justice
[48] Ryan, Stephen P. (2005), “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry”,
mimeo, MIT
[49] Ryan, Stephen P. and Catherine Tucker (2006), “Heterogeneity and the Dynamics of Technology
Adoption”, mimeo, MIT
[50] Sweeting, Andrew T. (2006), “Too Much Rock and Roll? Station Ownership, Programming and
Listenership in the Music Radio Industry”, mimeo, Duke University
[51] Tyler Mooney, Catherine (2006), “The Determinants and Eﬀects of Market Structure in the Radio
Broadcasting Industry”, mimeo, University of Virginia
[52] United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1997), Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, Washington DC: Department of Justice
[53] Waldfogel, Joel (2003), “Preference Externalities: An Empirical Study of Who Beneﬁts Whom
in Diﬀerentiated-Product Markets”, Rand Journal of Economics, 34(3), 557-568
46A Details of the Forward Simulation Procedure
In this Appendix I describe the forward simulation procedure which I use to calculate the components
of stations’ expected future payoﬀs.
A.1 Simulations Using Actual Station Strategies
The simulation procedure goes through the following steps in each time period.
1. the random coeﬃcients demand model is solved, given station formats, qualities and market
demographics, to give the listenership of each station in each of the 18 demographic groups. I
use 10 Halton draws per demographic group for the vF
i s;
2. the estimated revenue function is used to calculate discounted revenues for the station of interest.
These are added to the sum of discounted revenues from previous periods. The calculation is
done assuming that the station is independently owned. If the station is not Dark a discounted
indicator is added to the count of how many periods the station has been on-air. This count is
used in calculating expenditure on ﬁxed costs;
3. the variables which aﬀect the multinomial logit format choice problem for each station are
calculated. These include measures of competition and demographics which may have changed
since the previous period. All stations are assumed to be independently owned;
4. the multinomial logit choice probabilities for each station are calculated and compared with
random draws from a uniform distribution to simulate a choice for each station;
5. if the station of interest switches to an active format, a discounted indicator is added to the
count of how many times it has switched formats. The choice probabilities are used to calculate
the expected discounted value of the εFs associated with its format choice. The multinomial
47logit structure of its problem gives this expected value a convenient analytic form
E(εf|f chosen,S,ςs)=0 .57721 − log(Pr fs(S,ςs)) (33)
where Prfs is the probability that format f is chosen by station s given observed state space S
and strategies ςs.
6. the evolution of station qualities, conditional on current and previous format choices, is sim-
ulated. The random components are drawn from the appropriate empirical distribution of
observed quality innovations;
7. the evolution of demographics is simulated, by assuming that the same growth rate applies to
each of the demographic groups of the same ethnicity/race. The census data only provides
annual changes in growth rates, so I also only simulate changes in annual growth rates every
two periods, assuming that the same growth rate applies within two periods each year; and,
8. station formats are updated.
As some stations only switch formats with low probability, one would need many simulations to
get even a small number of simulations where the station switches formats. Therefore, I simulate
the expected payoﬀs from making each format choice in the ﬁrst period 20 times and weight these
simulations using the ﬁrst period choice probabilities. Each simulated path goes forward for 60
periods with a discount factor of 0.95. Results are similar using paths of 80 periods.
A.2 Simulations Using Alternative Station Strategies
The alternative strategies involve changing the conditional choice probabilities oft h es t a t i o no fi n t e r e s t .
The strategies of other stations remain the same as before. Therefore the only change to the above
procedure is that in step 4, I recalculate the choice probabilities for the station of interest according
to the alternative policy that I am using.
48Includes
Formats BIAfn Format Categories % Female % Under 25 % Under 49 % Black % Hispanic
Adult Contemporary Adult Contemporary 63.7% 13.9% 70.6% 7% 12%
Contemporary Hit Radio/Top 40 Contemporary Hit Radio/Top 40 61.0% 47.1% 92.7% 21% 24%
Country Country 53.2% 15.7% 61.3% 2% 6%
Oldies Oldies 51.4% 8.2% 45.8% 6% 15%
Rock Album Oriented Rock/Classic Rock 32.3% 23.1% 84.2% 3% 10%
Rock
Urban Urban 54.6% 33.3% 80.0% 81% 6%
News/Talk News, Talk, Sports 34.6% 3.3% 44.0% 8% 6%
Other Music Classical, Jazz, Easy 54.4% 7.9% 44.6% 20% 7%
Listening, Middle  of the Road, 
Nostalgia/Big Band, Miscellaneous
Ethnic, Variety
Religion Religion 65.5% 7.8% 57.6% 34% 9%
Spanish Language Spanish 48.4% 25.3% 81.1% 1% 96%
Notes: Female and age figures based on station-level Arbitron data for Spring 2006.  Black and Hispanic figures based on Arbitron estimates for Spring 2004 reported in 2005 Radio 
Today publication.  There are only a small number of Ethnic stations which fall primarily in a few markets, such as Honolulu.
Average Format Demographics 
Table 1: Formats and DemographicsNumber of  Proportion
station-qtr switching
From observations out Dark AC CHR Cntry Old Rock Urban News OtherM Relig Span
Dark 1,956 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.22 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.05
Adult Contemporary 11,508 0.04 0.01 0.25 0.10 0.13 0.24 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.04
CHR/Top 40 6,243 0.04 0.00 0.29 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Country 10,455 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.09
Oldies 5,592 0.06 0.01 0.26 0.09 0.13 0.31 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03
Rock 13,466 0.03 0.00 0.29 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.08
Urban 4,625 0.03 0.15 0.32 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.07
News/Talk/Sports 1,251 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.10
Other Music 3,164 0.08 0.01 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.06
Religion 2,656 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.06
Spanish 3,005 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.02
Number of  Proportion
station-qtr switching
From observations out Dark AC CHR Cntry Old Rock Urban News OtherM Relig Span
Dark 478 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.34 0.24 0.13 0.06
Adult Contemporary 496 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.37 0.02 0.06
CHR/Top 40 49 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.08
Country 1502 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.55 0.21 0.06 0.03
Oldies 905 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.52 0.19 0.08 0.02
Rock 121 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.26 0.18 0.09 0.06
Urban 1109 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.29 0.10 0.36 0.10
News/Talk/Sports 13066 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.29 0.14 0.17
Other Music 4240 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.58 0.05 0.07
Religion 3539 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.25 0.38 0.11 0.09
Spanish 2578 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.17 0.12
Of stations switching out, proportion switching to
Table 2: Format Switching Patterns
FM Stations
AM Stations
Of stations switching out, proportion switching toImplied PDV of Permanent
Population Aged Average Price Per 0.08 Percentage Point
12 and above 2004 Listener 2004 Increase in Listenership
Market Name (millions) ($) ($ millions)
Chicago 7.62 472 28.8
Minneapolis-St. Paul 2.58 599 12.4
Memphis 1.03 386 3.2
Anchorage, AK 0.22 625 1.1
Casper, WY 0.06 493 0.2
Notes: See Section 3 for assumptions underlying these calculations
Table 3: Back of the Envelope Calculation of Revenue Increases Due to Format SwitchingAC CHR Cntry Oldies Rock Urban News Other M Relig Spanish Pooled
Proportion Black -0.248 -0.201 -0.176 0.233 0.017 0.754** -0.679 0.198 1.336** -0.436 -
(0.651) (0.430) (0.629) (0.575) (0.590) (0.370) (0.716) (0.721) (0.553) (0.352)
Proportion Hispanic 0.221 -0.225 -0.301 0.481 -0.414 0.127 0.096 0.078 -0.577*** 0.604*** -
(0.273) (0.180) (0.268) (0.240)** (0.250) (0.154) (0.314) (0.320) (0.209) (0.155)
Out of Market Share -0.136 0.128 -2.161 -0.839** -0.225 -0.525** 1.875** 1.999 -8.241*** 0.451 -0.189***
(Competition) (0.705) (0.237) (2.124) (0.390) (0.319) (0.226) (0.798) (1.047) (3.011) (0.420) (0.059)
Number of market-format 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 5,480
quarters
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  **,*** denote statistical significance at the 5%,1% levels respectively.  Regressions use data from the first and last
quarters in which the market is observed in the Arbitron ratings data and include quarter and market-format fixed effects.  The pooled regression include 
format x quarter and format x demographic interactions.  
I instrument for the Out of Market Share variable in the following way: I calculate the average (across quarters) share of listening in each market to stations 
which are home to every other market.  I then find each station's average (across quarters) share of listening in its home market.  I multiply these two 
numbers together to calculate the predicted share of each out of market station.  I then add the predicted shares of all of the out of market stations in a 
format to create the instrument.  This instrument implicitly assumes that an out of market station's choice of format does not depend on the number of 
home market stations in a format.  This is a reasonable assumption for most markets in the data, as out of market stations with significant listenership 
are typically based in much larger markets and their format choices are unlikely to be affected by the decisions of stations in smaller markets.  For example,
several Boston stations have significant share of listenership in Worcester, MA, but only a small proportion of their listeners come from Worcester. 
Worcester stations have few listeners in Boston, so the format choices of Boston stations are unlikely to be influenced by those of Worcester stations.
Table 4: Long Differenced Regressions For The Proportion of Home Market Stations in A Market-FormatPopulation Population
Market Name 000s Market Name 000s
Los Angeles 10,397 Columbia, SC 445
Chicago, IL 7,399 Des Moines, IA 443
Dallas - Ft. Worth 4,198 Wichita, KS 443
Boston 3,846 Charleston, SC 446
Houston-Galveston 3,788 Spokane, WA 430
Detroit 3,818 Madison, WI 430
Atlanta, GA 3,348 Ft. Wayne, IN 409
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood 3,285 Lexington-Fayette, KY 403
Seattle-Tacoma 3,000 Chattanooga, TN 401
Phoenix, AZ 2,430 Roanoke-Lynchburg, VA 388
Minneapolis - St. Paul 2,459 Augusta, GA 391
St. Louis 2,154 Boise, ID 345
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater 2,006 Jackson, MS 357
Denver - Boulder 2,026 Reno, NV 329
Pittsburgh, PA 2,037 Shreveport, LA 319
Portland, OR 1,800 Corpus Christi, TX 299
Cleveland 1,797 Quad Cities, IA-IL 298
Sacramento, CA 1,562 Springfield, MO 270
Kansas City 1,450 Eugene - Springfield, OR 274
San Antonio, TX 1,377 Fayetteville, AR 251
Milwaukee - Racine 1,402 Salisbury-Ocean City, MD 267
Salt Lake City - Ogden 1,337 Macon, GA 256
Columbus, OH 1,315 Portland, ME 226
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill 1,224 South Bend, IN 219
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News 1,258 Binghamton, NY 217
Orlando 1,187 Anchorage, AK 216
Indianapolis, IN 1,205 Lubbock, TX 204
Las Vegas, NV 1,138 Odessa - Midland, TX 188
Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point 1,041 Yakima, WA 173
Austin, TX 1,035 Amarillo, TX 178
Nashville 1,011 Traverse City-Petoskey, MI 183
New Orleans 1,061 Medford-Ashland, OR 154
Memphis 1,002 Fargo, ND - Moorhead, MN 144
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 998 Duluth, MN - Superior, WI 173
Jacksonville, FL 936 Abilene, TX 131
Oklahoma City 992 Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 128
Louisville, KY 880 Panama City, FL 121
Richmond, VA 828 Eau Claire, WI 125
Birmingham, AL 823 Monroe, LA 121
Albany-Schenectady-Troy 746 Billings, MT 106
Honolulu 750 Sioux City, IA 102
Tucson, AZ 705 Williamsport, PA 102
Tulsa, OK 693 Grand Junction, CO 97
Grand Rapids, MI 669 Albany, GA 98
Ft. Myers-Naples-Marco Island 590 Harrisonburg, VA 95
Knoxville, TN 580 Rapid City, SD 94
Albuquerque, NM 575 San Angelo, TX 86
Omaha - Council Bluffs 563 Bismarck, ND 78
El Paso, TX 532 Meridian, MS 65
Little Rock, AR 510 Casper, WY 55
Table 5 : Markets Used in Estimating the Structural ModelStd Dev Age Age
of RC 25-49 50 plus Female Black Hispanic
Adult Contemporary 0.1680 0.7755 0.4146 0.5243 -0.5655 -0.6662
(5.9595) (0.0292) (0.1141) (0.0180) (0.1619) (0.2281)
CHR/Top 40 0.0135 -0.8848 -2.5559 0.2818 0.5957 0.0575
(3.8355) (0.0093) (0.0144) (0.0037) (0.0663) (0.0806)
Country 0.0780 0.3722 0.4482 0.0335 -1.9005 -1.6215
(2.0265) (0.0185) (0.0225) (0.0054) (0.0578) (0.0896)
Oldies 0.0004 0.9395 1.3447 -0.1154 -0.8404 -0.6259
(2.4052) (0.0264) (0.0253) (0.0084) (0.0870) (0.1331)
Rock 0.0000 0.2198 -1.3036 -0.8878 -1.8685 -1.1150
(1.3052) (0.0174) (0.0142) (0.0085) (0.0473) (0.0634)
Urban 0.1839 -0.0731 -0.5809 0.1337 3.5947 0.3526
(2.6119) (0.0068) (0.0408) (0.0146) (0.1306) (0.0880)
News 0.3249 1.6597 2.2926 -0.5445 -0.5504 -1.4128
(1.0074) (0.0190) (0.0180) (0.0062) (0.0460) (0.0557)
Other Music 0.0001 1.2660 2.3363 -0.0195 0.3574 -1.0140
(1.5411) (0.0129) (0.0149) (0.0037) (0.0633) (0.0951)
Religious 0.0006 0.8060 0.9891 0.4884 1.4627 -0.7644
(0.9300) (0.0073) (0.0112) (0.0050) (0.0718) (0.1085)
Spanish 0.5654 0.4935 0.3341 0.0016 -0.4913 4.2042
(0.8850) (0.0378) (0.0318) (0.0149) (0.0556) (0.0947)
Constant (commercial radio) 0.1159 ----
(1.7724)
Station
AM x Band Character. Specification A Specification B
Adult Contemporary -0.3549 Signal 1.0620 Stations Remaining in Format
(0.1858) coverage (0.1333) ρ1
ξ 0.8715 0.8792
CHR/Top 40 -0.5900 FM x 0.3168 (0.0044) (0.0044)
(0.2836) coverage (0.1439) Second period mean change for switchers 0.0942
Country -0.8341 Unlisted -1.0170 (0.0127)
(0.1483) station (0.0652)
Oldies -0.9500 Out of market  -0.6503 Stations Switching Format
(0.1733) station (0.1157) ρ2
ξ 0.7022 0.7067
Rock -1.1905 FM x 4.8269 (0.0090) (0.0168)
(0.1892) transm power (7.9842) μ2
ξ -0.0543 -0.0453
Urban -1.1037 AM x 1313.5612 (0.1076) (0.1082)
(0.1593) transm power (213.7973)
News -0.6000 FM x 13.7148
(0.1402) transm height (47.0044)
Other Music -0.8331 Station age -9.2514
(0.1396) (49.0453) Observations 42,858 42,858
Religious -0.9064 GMM Objective 1206.8 1202.3
(0.1471) DoF: 756, 99% critical value: 851.5
Spanish -1.2485
(0.1499)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Coefficients on time and market-format dummies not reported.  Nonlinear, AM x Band and station 
characteristic coefficients reported from quality transition specification A, but these coefficients are almost identical using specification B.
Table 6: Listener Demand Model Estimates
Quality Transition
Demographic Effects and Random Coefficients Data Simulation
Switching Stations
(Obs: 1,514)
Mean Change in Share 0.376 0.358
 (Percentage point x10)
Standard Deviation 2.245 2.852
 (Percentage point x10)
Correlation for
Individual Stations
    1 simulation
    Mean of 20 simulations
Non-Switching Stations
(Obs: 38,865)
Mean Change in Share -0.011 0.018
 (Percentage point x10)
Standard Deviation 1.674 2.192
 (Percentage point x10)
Correlation for
Individual Stations
    1 simulation
    Mean of 20 simulations
0.052
0.142
Table 7: Comparison of Changes in Share from Data
 and Simulations Using the Listener Demand Model
0.358
0.561(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics
Female 0.1588 0.1792 0.1529 0.1098
(0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0197) (0.0209)
Age 12-24 -0.4914 -0.4811 -0.5202 -0.5554
(0.0274) (0.0281) (0.0270) (0.0272)
Age 50+ -0.4610 -0.4590 -0.4502 -0.4732
(0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0181) (0.0188)
Black -0.2604 -0.2679 -0.2529 -0.2446
(0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0109)
Hispanic -0.1880 -0.1975 -0.1710 -0.1589
(0.0119) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0129)
Station Characteristics and Competition
Number of stations commonly - 0.0187 0.0148 0.0154
owned in format (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0042)
Number of stations owned - -0.0019 -0.0009 0.0004
by other firms in format (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Format switch in previous two - -0.1422 -0.1237 -0.1211
quarters (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0128)
Non-linear Revenue Effects
Station market share - - 7.7194 7.4543
less market average (0.6229) (0.6229)
Proportion of station's audience in - - - -0.2520
demographic group (0.0447)
Observations (station-year) 13,007 13,007 13,007 13,007
R
2 0.260 0.267 0.278 0.281
Measures of Fit
Change in Revenue for Non-Switchers ($k)
actual mean (std dev) 188 (1048) 188 (1048) 188 (1048) 188 (1048)
predicted mean (std dev) 120 (1081) 137 (1099) 137 (1153) 137 (1155)
correlation of actual, predicted 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40
Change in Revenue for Switchers ($k)
actual mean, std 140 (998) 140 (998) 140 (998) 140 (998)
predicted mean, std 320 (1672) 58 (1494) 92 (1505) 95 (1504)
correlation of actual predicted 0.58 0.52 0.55 0.56
Note: Estimation by Non-Linear Least Squares.  Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for
estimation error in the demand estimates by expressing as a GMM problem.  
Specifications include market-year fixed effects.
Table 8: Revenue Function EstimatesProportion Δ Proportion Proportion Δ Proportion Estimated
Hispanic Hispanic Black Black Mkt-Format
Quality
Dark -----
AC -1.182 -14.329 -0.258 -121.567 0.106
(0.729) (20.941) (1.033) (45.891) (0.204)
CHR -0.789 15.606 0.296 -83.262 0.051
(0.863) (22.586) (1.128) (49.974) (0.193)
Country -0.676 7.838 0.063 -39.356 -0.055
(0.842) (22.913) (1.085) (49.499) (0.196)
Oldies -0.765 -12.535 0.328 -115.425 0.180
(0.906) (25.150) (1.143) (52.507) (0.177)
Rock -1.113 0.676 -2.123 -52.334 0.244
(0.823) (20.849) (1.089) (46.518) (0.217)
Urban 0.545 13.639 9.613 -94.205 0.349
(0.818) (24.191) (1.761) (50.458) (0.133)
News -0.478 4.686 0.354 -79.623 0.192
(0.781) (21.250) (1.150) (49.865) (0.190)
Other M -1.448 14.097 0.516 -93.743 -0.060
(0.781) (22.127) (1.146) (50.283) (0.110)
Religion -0.717 -42.715 3.500 -23.511 0.137
(0.870) (25.853) (1.612) (58.553) (0.152)
Spanish 4.455 102.098 2.095 -84.457 0.469
(1.409) (21.506) (1.308) (58.522) (0.091)
Number of Combined Combined Combined 
stations share of fixed quality ξ of other
in format other stations of other  stations
stations
Dark ----
AC -0.137 -2.147 -0.022 -0.081
(0.062) (14.131) (0.064) (0.046)
CHR -0.288 27.145 -0.014 -0.143
(0.094) (19.235) (0.097) (0.086)
Country -0.203 24.348 -0.028 -0.065
(0.074) (12.466) (0.054) (0.043)
Oldies -0.013 -48.236 0.010 -0.149
(0.139) (33.648) (0.101) (0.099)
Rock -0.068 -11.125 0.069 -0.035
(0.048) (14.328) (0.059) (0.045)
Urban 0.070 -46.443 0.157 0.034
(0.062) (15.383) (0.070) (0.061)
News -0.109 1.356 0.028 -0.033
(0.062) (15.633) (0.048) (0.041)
Other M -0.054 14.324 -0.060 -0.047
(0.074) (18.360) (0.052) (0.047)
Religion 0.014 -88.928 0.060 0.068
(0.099) (43.376) (0.071) (0.083)
Spanish 0.139 -72.570 0.161 0.044
(0.073) (25.917) (0.048) (0.055)
Biggest station in format x stay 0.422 Current share x switch to dark -926.667
(0.0956) (305.9957)
Current share x switch -167.559
(16.1142) continues over....
Competition Variables
Table 9: Estimated Multinomial Logit Model for Conditional Choice Probabilities
Demographics and Mkt-Format AttractivenessStay x FM Stay x AM Switch x FM Switch x AM
Dark 4.414 3.852 --
(0.431) (0.441)
AC 6.509 5.999 2.895 -0.107
(1.539) (1.573) (1.528) (1.560)
CHR 4.935 3.889 1.359 -1.840
(1.147) (1.287) (1.141) (1.182)
Country 4.925 4.263 0.204 -0.584
(1.338) (1.337) (1.317) (1.329)
Oldies 6.282 6.091 2.179 1.031
(1.335) (1.328) (1.324) (1.319)
Rock 7.417 5.164 3.393 0.508
(1.325) (1.348) (1.307) (1.336)
Urban 6.135 6.137 2.075 0.460
(1.027) (1.050) (1.016) (1.044)
News 6.995 7.134 1.302 3.118
(1.567) (1.547) (1.532) (1.531)
Other M 4.001 3.741 -0.331 0.076
(0.967) (0.956) (0.955) (0.954)
Religion 6.820 6.727 0.797 1.029
(1.299) (1.270) (1.275) (1.278)
Spanish 8.236 7.763 2.592 2.455
(0.906) (0.876) (0.858) (0.877)
200k-500k 500k-1m 1m-2m 2m-4m 4m+
0.029 0.040 -0.218 -0.339 -0.417
(0.029) (0.098) (0.100) (0.112) (0.156)
Number 
stations Recent ownership switch 0.058
commonly owned (0.081)
nationwide Number owned in current -0.079
Dark - market-format x stay (0.048)
AC 0.005 Number owned in alternative 0.124
(0.002) market format x switch (0.050)
CHR 0.013
(0.003) Stations commonly owned 0.025
Country 0.008 by other firms in current format (0.067)
(0.002) x stay
Oldies 0.011 Stations commonly owned 0.053
(0.005) by other firms in alternative format (0.059)
Rock 0.006 x switch
(0.002) Recent Format Switch 0.058







(0.012) Number of observations: 41,539
Spanish 0.046 Log-Likelihood: -9344.0
(0.010)
Note: Estimation by Maximum Likelihood.  Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for
estimation error in the demand estimates by expressing as a GMM problem.  
Table 9 cont.
Ownership Variables & Miscellaneous Variables
Switch Variables
Switch x Mkt PopAnnual Station Revenues in 2004, $m
    Mean
    Maximum
Parameter Estimates, $m
Sunk Repositioning Costs (θ1) [0.73, 81.67] [6.35, 47.03] [0.67, 13.75] [0.10, 10.31] [0.05, 2.38] [0.15, 2.88]
    95% CI [0.03, 190.54] [0.993 94.72] [0.07, 39.33] [-0.19, 19.30] [-0.10, 9.05] [0.06, 5.22]
Fixed Costs of Active Stations (θ2) [0, 11.93] [0, 6.89] [0, 2.89] [0, 1.63] [0, 0.58] [0, 0.54]
    95% CI [0, 15.83] [0, 8.50] [0, 3.43] [0, 1.75] [0, 0.88] [0, 0.60]
Scale of ε (σ) [0, 12.20] [0, 4.69] [0, 1.79] [0, 1.53] [0, 0.31] [0, 0.36]
    95% CI [0, 27.53] [0, 10.66] [0, 6.08] [0, 2.96] [0, 1.21] [0, 0.74]
Number of Station Observations
Used in Second Stage Estimation (Fall 2004)
Number of Markets
Costs of Observed Switching 1997-2006, $m
Average Foregone Commercial
Revenues in Year Following Switch
Average Sunk Repositioning Cost Paid 
(εs interpreted as heterogeneity in switching costs)
   Lower bound
   Upper bound
Total Sunk Repositioning Costs Spent 
1997-2006 at Upper Bound
Notes: $ numbers calculated using estimated value of listeners in 2004 for each market.  Bounds and conservative confidence intervals calculated using the methods proposed by Pakes et al. (2006).
Parameters assumed to be the same for all stations within a market size group.
Sunk Repositioning Costs (θ1) [-4.29, 73.57] [3.08, 39.04] [-0.54, 11.06] [-0.50, 9.13] [-0.28, 2.42] [-0.04, 2.75]
    95% CI [-7.11, 171.63] [-0.02 78.50] [-1.08, 32.79] [-0.72, 18.69] [-0.44, 7.93] [-0.13, 5.35]
Fixed Costs of Active Stations (θ2) [0, 11.49] [0, 6.02] [0, 2.46] [0, 1.53] [0, 0.68] [0, 0.52]
    95% CI [0, 21.6] [0, 7.79] [0, 3.22] [0, 1.63] [0, 0.89] [0, 0.58]
Scale of ε (σ) [0, 11.39] [0, 3.98] [0, 1.54] [0, 1.41] [0, 0.36] [0, 0.36]
    95% CI [0, 39.61] [0, 9.28] [0, 5.58] [0, 2.82] [0, 1.19] [0, 0.75]
Average Sunk Repositioning Cost Paid 
Lower bound
Upper bound
Notes: same as above.
2.42 1.40 0.48 0.77
3.69 1.95
-4.29 3.08 -0.54 -0.50
(LA and Chicago) (Seattle-Dallas) (Portland, OR (Little Rock-Buffalo) (Casper, WY 
-Memphis) -Columbia, SC) to Monroe, LA)
Table 10(a): Second Stage Parameter Estimates - Sunk Repositioning Costs











Table 10(b): Alternative Estimates of Sunk Format Switching Costs
Excluding the Post-Switch Increase in Quality (Demand Specification A)
11.54 20.25
4.1







































(Casper, WY Population > 5 million Population 3-5 million Population 1-3 million Population 500k-1million Population 250k-500k Population <250k
(LA and Chicago) (Seattle-Dallas) (Portland, OR- (Little Rock- Macon, GA- (Casper, WY-
Memphis) Buffalo) Columbia, SC) Monroe, LA)
Change in Time Spent Listening 
Due to Format Switching 1997-2006, %
White -5.1% -5.0% -3.1% 1.7% 3.3% 4.5%
(4.61%) (1.99%) (2.39%) (2.85%) (3.11%) (3.22%)
Black 5.8% 18.6% 23.6% 32.5% 9.9% 29.1%
(5.38%) (7.31%) (5.39%) (7.62%) (5.75%) (10.33%)
Hispanic 20.7% 26.1% 63.1% 55.6% 39.7% 20.6%
(5.92%) (13.60%) (14.35%) (12.57%) (12.15%) (8.14%)
Aged 12-24 10.9% 3.9% 14.8% 21.1% 10.6% 22.9%
(4.95%) (3.26%) (3.26%) (3.52%) (3.42%) (5.92%)
Aged 25-49 5.6% 4.3% 6.3% 11.3% 6.6% 10.4%
(4.68%) (2.79%) (2.67%) (2.94%) (3.11%) (3.60%)
Aged 50+ -3.1% -1.1% -3.4% -5.2% 0.8% -1.6%
(4.88%) (2.38%) (2.77%) (2.96%) (3.34%) (3.59%)
Women 4.6% 1.8% 4.7% 5.0% 5.7% 4.5%
(4.82%) (2.63%) (2.70%) (3.13%) (3.35%) (3.40%)
Total 3.4% 2.4% 4.3% 6.7% 5.1% 7.6%
(4.51%) (2.61%) (2.63%) (3.00%) (3.14%) (3.46%)
Change in Per Period Revenues Due to
Format Switching 1997-2006, $m
Stations switching between active formats
   per station 0.51 0.30 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00
(2.01) (0.85) (0.26) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05)
   total 17.50 19.07 9.21 10.20 3.34 -0.45
(68.26) (53.39) (66.28) (18.55) (21.96) (8.14)
Stations switching from Dark
   per station 1.66 1.50 0.89 0.71 0.45 0.20
(0.33) (0.57) (0.19) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04)
   total 1.66 7.49 34.59 19.14 12.48 9.66
(0.33) (2.84) (7.38) (2.61) (1.82) (1.87)
Stations remaining in the same active format
   per station -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.28) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
   total -1.94 -3.44 -1.27 -3.08 -2.10 -0.98
(15.20) (13.07) (14.13) (3.00) (8.38) (2.03)
Notes: Standard deviations from using 50 simulation draws from the distribution of the first stage parameters in parentheses.
Table 11: Effects of Format Switching 1997-2006 on Station Revenues and Listeners
Market SizeFigure 1: Market Shares of Switching Stations
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Market Share 95% CI BELOW 95% CI ABOVE
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Kernel Density Estimate of Share Change Proportion of Stations Switching FormatFigure 3(a): Relationship Between Switching Rate and Average Number of Listeners Per Station











456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
































































Figure 3(b): Market Shares of Switching Stations By Market Size
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Markets Ranked 1-30 95% CI BELOW 95% CI ABOVE
Markets Ranked 31-80 95% CI BELOW 95% CI ABOVE
Markets Ranked 81-274 95% CI BELOW 95% CI ABOVEFigure 4(a): Bounds on Switching Costs Corresponding to Inequalities (28) and (29)
Figure 4(b): Bounds on Switching Costs Corresponding to Inequalities (28), (29) and (30)














































Upper bound on σFigure 5: Bounds in Other Market Groups

















































































)Figure 6(a) and (b): Innovations in Station Quality
Figure 6(c): Empirical Distribution of Unobserved Station Qualities













Kernel Density Plot of ν for Non-Switching Stations













Kernel Density Plot of ν for Switching Stations

















Kernel Density Plot of ξFigure 7: Simulated vs. Actual Changes in Share 
for Switching and Non-Switching Stations



































yFigure 8: Distribution of Changes in Revenues for Stations Remaining in the Same Format 1997-2006








































































































































































Reduction in Competition Increase in Competition No Change in Competition






































































Mean Mean -1SD Mean +1SD